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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has experienced several phases of federal tort re-
forms.' Congress' initial legislative reform efforts sought to alter state
tort law applicable between common carriers and their employees by
eliminating a number of common law defenses and substituting a com-
parative negligence standard.2 In this regard, after the 1906 Employers'
Liability Act3 was struck down on Commerce Clause grounds,4 Congress
narrowed the law and enacted a similar law, the 1908 Employers' Liabil-
ity Act.5
Commencing in the middle part of the century, Congress sought to
encourage a variety of forms of conduct-such as the construction of
nuclear power facilities 6 and swine flu immunization 7-by granting po-
tential defendants partial immunity from tort liability. In exchange for
forfeiting common law rights against these private parties, claimants
were granted offsetting legal benefits, such as the ability to seek damages
against the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act.8
1 As used herein, the phrase "federal tort reform" is not intended to have a favorable or
unfavorable connotation, but rather to generically describe a statutory law or proposal pre-
empting state tort law.
2 1906 Employers' Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 59-219, 34 Stat. 232 (codified at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60) (1906) (repealed 1907) and 1908 Employers' Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 60-
100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994)).
3 Pub. L. No. 59-219, 34 Stat. 232 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60) (1906) (repealed
1907).
4 Infra note 29 and accompanying text.
5 Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1994)).
6 Atomic Testing Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1837, 42 U.S.C. § 2212
(1994).
7 National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat.
1113, 42 U.S.C. § 247b (1976) (repealed 1978).
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994).
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Beginning in the 1990's, Congress commenced what can be viewed
as a third phase of, or wave of, tort reform. These laws and proposals
limit or pare back a number of common law rights of action, often with-
out providing any direct substitute or alternative legal remedy to claim-
ants. The initiatives affect a range of activities-from volunteerism to
various types of commercial conduct.9
A major unanswered question with respect to this "third wave" of
tort reform is the extent to which these laws and proposals conform with
constitutional requirements. We expect adversely impacted claimants to
assert that the reforms: (1) exceed Congress' legislative authority under
the Commerce Clause (and, to the extent applicable, section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment); (2) violate Fifth Amendment due process and
equal protection requirements; (3) violate Seventh Amendment jury trial
rights; and (4) are inconsistent with Tenth Amendment federalism princi-
ples. To analyze and consider these claims, we review Supreme Court
and lower court decisions considering the constitutionality of earlier fed-
eral tort reform laws.
We find that although all but one of the previous federal tort reform
laws were ultimately upheld against a variety of constitutional chal-
lenges, 10 the current set of initiatives raise a number of novel legal ques-
tions that have yet to be directly and fully addressed by the Supreme
Court. For example, several of the measures, such as the Bill Emerson
Good Samaritan Food Donation Act' and the Volunteer Protection Act
of 1997,12 may have a significant impact on intrastate activity, and could
therefore be found inconsistent with Congress' Commerce Clause au-
thority, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lopez v.
United States.13
In the event Congress' Commerce Clause authority is struck down
with regard to a particular tort reform, defendants may assert that the law
is based on Congress' authority to protect due process under section five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly to the extent the tort reform
includes punitive damage limitations. While cases such as BMW of
9 Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 14501- 14505 (West Supp. 11I 1997)); General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552-54 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note
(1994)); Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 6601 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17
(1999)); Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105' Cong. (1998).
10 See infra note 29.
11 Pub. L. No. 104-210, 110 Stat. 3011 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1791 (West
Supp. 1998)).
12 Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14501- 14505 (West
Supp. III 1997)).
13 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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North America v. Gore14 and Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg15 invalidated
"particular state law punitive damage awards as violating due process, the
Court has yet to evaluate legislative efforts by Congress to affirmatively
codify limitations on punitive damages.
Supreme Court guidance may also be necessary to ascertain the ex-
tent the Seventh Amendment jury trial right operates as a constraint on
Congress' ability to limit common law rights, such as capping the
amount of non-economic damages payable in particular tort actions. On
the few occasions this issue has been presented to the courts in the con-
text of previous federal tort reforms, the Seventh Amendment issue has
been side-stepped since the law in question provided for separate admin-
istrative remedies against the United States. 16
A final potential constitutional issue presented by the recent set of
tort reforms concerns federalism and state sovereignty. Tort reforms
such as those relating to medical implant suppliers, 17 Y2K liability ac-
tions, 18 and the tobacco settlement' 9 have and would impose detailed and
rigorous procedural as well as substantive requirements upon state
courts. If the Court is willing to extend the federalism concerns enunci-
ated in New York v. United States2° and Printz v. United States,21 these
initiatives could also be subject to credible challenges under the Tenth
Amendment.
II. THE FIRST WAVE: EXPANDING EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
BY WAIVING COMMON LAW DEFENSES
Although an analysis of state tort reform laws is beyond the scope of this
article, according to a recent study, in the last fourteen years twenty-four
states have handed down seventy-five separate decisions overturning all
or part of these laws. At the same time, courts have issued one hundred
twenty decisions upholding various aspects of the state laws.22 Con-
14 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
15 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
16 See infra note 393.
17 The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act, H.R. 872, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
18 The Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 6601 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17
(1999)).
19 Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement, 12.3 TPLR 3.203 (June 20, 1997).
20 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
21 521 U.S. 98 (1997).
22 See Schwartz, Behrens & Taylor, Appendix A & B.
THE THmD WAvE OF FEDERAL TORT REFORM
gress' 23 first effort to preempt state tort law24 came in the form of the
1906 Employers' Liability Act25 and the 1908 Employers' Liability
Act.26 Both laws represented efforts to eliminate certain common law
employer defenses and substitute a comparative (as opposed to a contrib-
23 In contrast to the relatively small number and modest scope of federal tort reforms,
states have adopted numerous statutory changes to their own tort laws. In the early part of the
1900's, states enacted a series of workers' compensation laws ultimately upheld by the
Supreme Court in cases such as New York Central R. Co. v. White and Mountain Timber v.
Washington, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929) (upholding Con-
necticut automobile guest statute); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S.
549 (1910) (upholding Iowa law abrogating fellow servant doctrine); Arizona Employers Lia-
bility Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919) (upholding Arizona law providing strict employer liability
for inherently dangerous work).
More recently, states have enacted tort laws providing protections to defendants with
every state adopting some form of tort reform in the last twenty some years. See Martha
Middleton, A Changing Landscape, ABA JOURNAL, 56, 59 (1995). For useful summaries of
the nature of the statutory changes made by the states, see VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, MARK
E. BEHRENS, & MARK D. TAYLOR, WHO SHOULD MAKE AMERICA'S TORT LAW:
COURTS OR LEGISLATURES? (Washington Legal Foundation) (1997); Mark Thompson,
Letting the Air out of Tort Reform, ABA JOURNAL, 64 (1997); Henry Cohen, Fifly-State
Survey on Selected Product Liability Issues, May 24, 1995 (Congressional Research Service
Report 95-300A).
24 In addition to adopting laws preempting state common law of tort, Congress has en-
acted a number of liability laws pursuant to its maritime and international treaty authority. See
Limitation of Vessel Owners Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 181-196 (1994) (enacted in
1893) (setting shipping liability rules in case of damage or harm occurring without privity or
knowledge of ship owner), found to constitute valid exercise of Congress' maritime and com-
merce authority in Providence & New York Steamship Co. v. Hill Manufacturing Co., 109 U.S.
578 (1883); Longshoreman and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1994) (enacted in 1927) (providing a workers' compensation scheme for injuries occurring in
the navigable waters of the United States), upheld against due process challenge in Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage By Air (Warsaw Convention), Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), T.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, as amended and supplemented by Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol (Montreal Agreement), Agree-
ment No. CAB 18,999, approved by Order No. E-28, 680, May 13, 1966 (CAB Docket
17,325), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1994) (limits international air carriers' potential liabil-
ity for property loss or damage or personal injury to $75,000 and creates a presumption of
liability for accidents and limiting passengers' recovery for injuries during transportation cov-
ered by the Convention) upheld against constitutional challenge in Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Pierre v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957). See also Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act,
46 U.S.C. App. §§ 761 - 68 (setting liability rules for negligence and other misconduct on the
high seas); 46 U.S.C. app. 688 (1994) (abrogating the fellow servant rule and granting seamen
the same rights as railway workers under the Employers Liability Act of 1908); 46 U.S.C.A.
§ 183 (West Supp. 1998) (recognizing certain limitations on non-economic damages set forth
in cruise ship contracts and tickets and permitting international owners to rely on state statu-
tory damage limitations relating to employee medical malpractice claims).
25 Pub. L. No. 59-219, 34 Stat. 232 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60) (1906) (repealed
1907).
26 Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1994)).
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utory) negligence regime.27 The principal constitutional issue raised in
Supreme Court challenges was whether the laws were authorized under
the Commerce Clause (although the Court also briefly considered issues
in the nature of due process and federalism concerns). 28
A. 1906 EMPLOYERS' LLmLrrY ACT
The 1906 Employers' Liability Act (the "1906 Act")29 required, inter
alia, that common carriers compensate their employees for damages
caused by defects in equipment or the negligence of their fellow employ-
ees, eliminated the common law doctrine of contributory negligence and
substituted a form of comparative negligence, and eliminated any bars or
defenses to liability set forth in employment contracts.30 The 1906 Act
applied to "every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce...
between the several states . . . [with regard to] any of its
employees .... "31
In The Employers' Liability Cases,32 the Court considered the con-
stitutionality of the 1906 Act. The Court first considered the question of
whether Congress had the authority to enact laws dealing with the
master-servant relationship, "a subject hitherto treated as being exclu-
sively within the control of the states. '33 The Court rejected this conten-
tion, holding, "the test of power is not merely the matter regulated, but
whether the regulation is directly one of interstate commerce .... -4
Next, the Court considered whether the 1906 Act constituted a valid
exercise of Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce under the
Commerce Clause.35 Although the statute was limited to carriers en-
gaged in interstate commerce, the Court read the law as applying to in-
stances where such carriers were transacting purely intrastate business. 36
Therefore, the court held the 1906 Act was being applied in an unconsti-
tutional manner:
27 Under the doctrine of contributory negligence a plaintiff is completely barred from
recovery if he or she bears any amount of fault, while comparative negligence reduces a plain-
tiffs recovery by his or her percentage of negligence. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 552A (1977).
28 See The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1907) and The Second Employers'
Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York), 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
29 Pub. L. No. 59-219, 34 Stat. 232 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60) (1906) (repealed
1907).
30 See id.
31 Id. § 51.
32 207 U.S. 463 (1907).
33 207 U.S. at 491.
34 Id. at 495.
35 See infra note 296.
36 207 U.S. at 503.
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Concluding, as we do, that the statute, whilst it embraces subjects
within the authority of Congress to regulate commerce, also includes
subjects not within its constitutional power, and that the two are so inter-
blended in the statute that they are incapable of separation, we are of the
opinion that the courts below rightly held the statute to be repugnant of
the Constitution and non-enforceable .... 37
Having found the 1906 Act's asserted regulation of intrastate com-
merce to be unconstitutional, the Court put off considering arguments
that the law violated employers' Fifth Amendment due process rights38
(i.e., because it was claimed to have arbitrarily subjected common carri-
ers to greater liability than other employers engaged in interstate com-
merce), and that it compromised employers' Seventh Amendment39 right
to a jury trial.4o
Subsequently, in El Paso & Northeastern Railway Co. v. Gutier-
rez,41 the Court found that the 1906 Act could be applied to United States
territories "[i]n view of the plenary power of Congress under the Consti-
tution over the Territories of the United States." 42 Since the Court con-
cluded that the provisions of the Act declared unconstitutional in The
Employers' Liability Cases were separable and that Congress would have
enacted them independently, it upheld the law in these areas.43
B. 1908 EMPLOYERS' LiA.mrrY ACT
In 1908 Congress enacted a substantially similar version of the Employ-
ers' Liability Act (the "1908 Act"), limiting the statute to cases involving
employees "suffering injury while... employed by [carriers engaged in
interstate commerce] in such commerce ... ."44 Employers again com-
plained that the law imposed substantially more liability on them than
they were subject to under the common law, and hence challenged its
constitutionality. In 1912, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
law in The Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York).45
On this occasion, the Court found the law constituted a valid exer-
cise of Congress' commerce authority.46 Although the 1908 Act was
limited to injuries involving persons employed in interstate commerce, it
37 207 U.S. at 504.
38 See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
39 See infra note 386 and accompanying text.
40 207 U.S. at 503.
41 215 U.S. 87 (1909).
42 Il at 93.
43 Id. at 96-97.
44 Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1994)).
45 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
46 Id.
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had been asserted the law should be struck down because co-employees
causing the injury may not have been so engaged. The Court disagreed,
observing "this is a mistaken theory, in that it treats the source of the
injury, rather than its effect upon interstate commerce, as the criterion of
congressional power."47
The Court also considered and rejected several objections to the
1908 Act in the nature of due process concerns-that it unreasonably
abrogated common law rules, that it interfered with "liberty of con-
tract," 48 and that it arbitrarily placed employers in a "disfavored class." 49
The Court disposed of the contention that the law unreasonably altered
rules of common law, quoting from their 1876 decision in Munn v. lli-
nois5° for the proposition that:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the com-
mon law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more
sacred than any other. Rights of property which have been created by the
common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law
itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will.., of the legisla-
ture, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the greater
office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are
developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances. 51
The Court also found that changes in common law liability rules
would promote workplace safety and were well within Congress' discre-
tion.52 The fact that other states had enacted special rules concerning
workplace liability was of little importance to the Court, which observed
that such laws "were far from uniform" and it was left to Congress to
determine whether national law "would better serve the needs of
commerce."
53
The Court readily disposed of the "liberty of contract argument"
raised by the employers. Recent decisions had established that "if Con-
gress possesses the power to impose ... liability, which we here hold
that it does, it also possesses the power to insure its efficacy by prohibit-
ing any contract, rule, regulation or device in evasion of it."54
As for the question of whether the 1908 Act effectuated an imper-
missible classification discriminating against railways, the Court found
47 Id. at 51 (citations omitted).
48 IaM at 49.
49 Id.
50 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (Illinois statute setting maximum grain storage rates upheld
against Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge that it abrogates the common law rule
that such charges are required to be "reasonable").
51 223 U.S. at 50, citing Munn, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (additional citations omitted).
52 223 U.S. at 51.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 52.
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that even if it is assumed that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
incorporates the same standards as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, the law was not unconstitutional:
[The Equal Protection Clause] does not take from Congress the
power to classify, nor does it condemn exertions of that power merely
because they occasion some inequalities. On the contrary, it admits of
the exercise of a wide discretion in classifying according to general,
rather than minute distinctions, and condemns what is done only when it
is without any reasonable basis, and is therefore purely arbitrary....
Tested by these standards, this classification is not objectionable.55
The Court next considered a federalism-related question-whether
Congress had the authority to preempt state laws concerning the same
subject matter as the 1908 Act. Using a straightforward Supremacy
Clause analysis to reject this concern, the Court quoted McCulloch v.
Maryland56 for the proposition that the "government of the United
States... though limited in powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made
in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land, 'any-
thing in the Constitution or the laws of any state, to the contrary
notwithstanding.'- 57
The Court also used the Supremacy Clause as the constitutional jus-
tification for allowing the 1908 Act to be enforced in state court. The
Court reasoned, "[tihe fact that a state court derives its existence and
functions from the state laws is no reason why it should not afford relief;
because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as
much bound to recognize those laws as operative within the state as it is
to recognize the state laws."'58
C. BLACK LUNG BENEFITS Acr OF 1972
Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 197259 ("Black Lung Bene-
fits Act"), requires that employers provide benefits to coal miners suffer-
ing from "black lung disease" (pneumonoconiosis) and their survivor
families.60 Although enacted more than sixty years after the 1908 Em-
ployers' Liability Act, The Black Lung Benefits Act can be seen as con-
sistent with the first wave of federal tort reforms through its restrictions
on employer legal rights.61
55 Id. at 53 (citations omitted).
56 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
57 223 U.S. at 53, citing McCulloch at 405.
58 223 U.S. at 58.
59 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994).
60 Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969).
61 Rather than preempting state common law directly, the Black Lung Benefits Act had
the effect of preempting state workers' compensation laws.
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Shortly after the Black Lung Benefits Act was enacted, a number of
coal mine operators challenged its constitutionality, claiming it violated
their Fifth Amendment due process rights because it applied "retrospec-
tively" (by requiring the benefit payments be made to miners who had
left employment before the law's effective date), and asserting that the
presumptions and evidentiary rules were arbitrary and irrational.62 In
1976, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these provisions
in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.63
In reviewing the retrospective applicability of the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act, the Court observed it was "by now well established that legisla-
tive Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the
Court with a presumption of constitutionality," 64 and it had previously
upheld laws effectuating "workmen's compensation principles analogous
to those enacted here."'65 In this case, the Court found that the retrospec-
tive liability scheme in question was justified and rational, even though it
applied to mine operators doing business prior to the law's enactment:
We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme
by examining the degree to which the "cost-savings" enjoyed by opera-
tors in the pre-enactment period produced "excess" profits, or the degree
to which the retrospective liability imposed on the early operators can
now be passed on to the consumer. It is enough to say that the Act
approaches the problem of cost spreading rationally; whether a broader
cost-spreading scheme would have been wiser or more practical is not a
question of constitutional dimension.66
62 The specific presumptions and evidentiary rules objected to included: (1) the defini-
tion of total disability under § 402(f) of the Black Lung Benefits Act requiring compensation
for former miners who might be employable in other lines of work; (2) the irrebuttable pre-
sumption of total disability under § 411(c)(3) where there is clinical evidence of complicated
pneumoconiosis; (3) the rebuttable presumptions under § 411(c)(1) and (2) that operators were
responsible for pneumoconiosis for miners employed more than ten years; (4) the rebuttable
presumption under § 411(c)(4) that miners employed for more than fifteen years who are able
to marshal evidence demonstrating a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary ailment have
been disabled by pneumoconiosis; (5) the requirement under § 413(b) that claims for benefits
not be denied solely on the basis of negative chest X-rays; and (6) the limitation on the use of
rebuttal evidence in cases under § 411(c)(4). See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 22-37 (1976).
63 428 U.S. 1 (1976). The case proceeded directly to the Supreme Court after being
considered by a three-judge district court panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1994).
See Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Brennan, 385 F. Supp. 424 (1974) (upholding the provi-
sions of the Black Lung Benefits Act against constitutional challenge, with the exception of
the limitation on the use of rebuttal evidence in cases under § 411(c)(4)).
64 428 U.S. at 15 (citations omitted).
65 Id, (citing New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917)) (New Yorker
workers' compensation law); Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R. Co. v. Schubert, 224
U.S. 603 (1912) (1908 Employers Liability Act).
66 Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
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The Court applied a similar analysis in considering the various chal-
lenges to the Black Lung Benefits Act's presumptions and evidentiary
rules, finding each to have a rational basis.67 In dicta, however, the
Court refused to grant Congress totally unfettered discretion in setting
liability rules, indicating it might face a far more difficult problem up-
holding legislation granting benefits retrospectively to families of miners
who did not die of black lung disease and who were unaware and unaf-
fected by the illness during their lives.68
III. THE SECOND WAVE: ENCOURAGING BENEFICIAL
ACTIVITIES BY LIMITING PLAINTIFFS' COMMON
LAW RIGHTS IN EXCHANGE FOR
OFFSETTNG LEGAL BENEFITS
The second wave of federal tort reform began in the middle of the 20t'
century when Congress enacted a number of laws granting liability pro-
tections for defendants while generally providing substitute remedies for
harmed parties. The following is an analysis of these "second wave"
laws which have been challenged on constitutional grounds.69
A. FEDERAL DRIVERs ACT
In 1961, Congress enacted the Federal Drivers Act,70 making the Fed-
eral Torts Claims Act the exclusive remedy for injuries resulting from
the operation of a motor vehicle by government employees acting within
67 1&L at 22-38.
68 l& at 26.
69 Congress has enacted a number of federal tort reforms which have not been challenged
on constitutional grounds in federal court. These include several instances in which Congress
has elected to substitute the United States as a defendant for volunteers performing a variety of
activity associated with the Federal Government. See, e.g., (1) Federally Supported Health
Centers Assistance Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 233 (g) & (o) (1994) (health centers and their
officers, employees, and contractors and health clinic professionals); (2) National Service
Trust Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12651b(f) & 12651g (a)(B) (1994) (enacted in 1993) (board members
and volunteers in the National and Community Service program); (3) Take Pride in America
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4604 (c)(2) (1994) (Take Pride in America Act volunteers) (enacted in 1990);
(4) Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, 22 U.S.C. § 5422 (c)(2)(A) (1994)
(volunteers providing technical assistance to Poland or Hungary); (5) Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1737 (f) (1994) (Bureau of Land Management volun-
teers); (6) Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 5055(f)(3) (1994) (VISTA
volunteers); (7) Volunteers in the National Forests Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 558c(b) (1994)
(Forest Service volunteers); (8) Volunteers in Parks Act of 1969, 16 U.S.C. § 18i(b) (1994)
(National Parks volunteers); (9) Peace Corps Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2504(h)(1994) (enacted in
1961) (Peace Corps volunteers); (10) Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 742f(c)(4)
(1994) (volunteers in Fish and Wildlife Service or National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration programs); (11) Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995, 42
U.S.C. § 203 note (Supp. I 1995); and (12) 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 note (West Supp. IV 1997).
70 Pub. L. No. 87-258, §1, 75 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679)
(1994)).
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the scope of their employment. 71 Unlike many private employers, the
Federal Government did not obtain private liability insurance for its em-
ployees, and Congress considered the Act necessary to allow the govern-
ment to attract competent drivers. 72 The Federal Drivers Act was upheld
against a variety of constitutional challenges in Carr v. United States,73
Thomason v. Sanchez,74 and Nistendirk v. McGee.75
Carr involved an action in which a federal employee brought an
automobile liability action against a co-employee, claiming the Federal
Drivers Act violated due process by abrogating common law rights with-
out providing a legislative quid pro quo.7 6 The Fourth Circuit responded
first that the premise of that argument had been rejected in Silver v. Sil-
ver77 (upholding the constitutionality of a Connecticut guest statute
preventing 'non-paying guests from bringing negligence suits against
owners or operators of automobiles), when the Supreme Court held "the
Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of
old rights recognized by the common law.' '78 Secondly, Carr observed
"in any event Congress provided an adequate quid pro quo for the com-
mon law cause of action which it abolished."79 The court believed this to
be the case even if the plaintiff, as a federal employee, was not entitled to
bring suit against the Federal Government.80 This was because the Fed-
eral Drivers Act benefited all federal employees-including the plain-
tiff-by providing them with protection against liability from automobile
accidents. 81
Carr also rejected the contention that the Federal Drivers Act de-
nied the plaintiff his equal protection rights by treating automobile liabil-
ity actions in a manner different from other liability actions involving
government co-workers.8 2 The court found that "the statutory classifica-
tion comes here clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and it
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.''83 In this instance, the Fourth Circuit found the Federal Driv-
71 Id. § 2679(b).
72 See S. Rep. No. 87-736 (1961), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2784.
73 422 F.2d 1007 (4-h Cir. 1970).
74 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976).
75 225 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
76 422 F.2d 1007.
77 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
78 Id. at 122.
79 422 F.2d at 1011.
80 See id. at 1101. A Torts Claims Act remedy may not be available to federal workers
because of the exclusivity provisions of the Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 8116(c).
81 422 F.2d at 1101.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1012 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426).
THE T~mD WAVE OF FEDERAL TORT REFORM
ers Act to be a justified response to the problem of an undue financial
burden otherwise being placed on government drivers.84
Thomason represented another case where the Federal Drivers Act
was upheld against a due process challenge. 85 The Third Circuit held
that the right to sue a co-worker does not enjoy constitutional protection
and that statutory classifications along these lines "need not be justified
by a compelling governmental interest" and do not "create a suspect clas-
sification" or "involve a fundamental interest."' 86 The court found the
Federal Drivers Act to be a reasonable response to the financial burden
imposed on government workers and that "the magnitude of the automo-
bile insurance problem justified Congress' separate treatment of this spe-
cific problem." 87
Finally, in Nistendirk, a federal district court considered and re-
jected the argument that the Federal Drivers Act violated the plaintiffs
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 88 The court found that where a
common law action was eliminated entirely and an action against the
government substituted in its place, "the guarantees of the Seventh
Amendment do not apply."89
B. THE PRICE-ANDERSON Acr
As enacted in 1957,90 and amended in 1966,91 and 1975,92 the Price-
Anderson Act ("Price-Anderson") 93 provided for a maximum aggregate
liability of $560 million in the event of a nuclear accident at a federally
licensed nuclear power plant, such maximum amount to be distributed to
claimants from a pool of funds derived from the owner's insurance, con-
tributions from other nuclear plant owners, and the Federal Govern-
ment.94 In exchange for these benefits, the plant owner was required to
waive all of its defenses to liability if sued as a result of a nuclear acci-
dent, and Congress was required to take whatever additional action was
deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public.95
84 Id.
85 539 F.2d 955
86 539 F.2d 955, 959 (3d Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
87 IL at 959-60.
88 225 F. Supp. 881.
89 Id. at 881, 882.
90 Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957).
91 Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (1966).
92 Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111-1115 (1975).
93 Codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994).
94 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1994). The Price-Anderson Act required the nuclear industry to
purchase the maximum level of liability insurance available on the market-$60 million-and
provided that the Federal Government would indemnify the industry, if necessary, up to $500
million.
95 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(n)(1), 2210(c) (1994).
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In 1978, the Court upheld Price-Anderson in Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group,96 the most recent Supreme Court
decision concerning the constitutionality of a federal tort reform. In
Duke Power, after finding the plaintiffs-a group of individuals who
lived near proposed new nuclear power plants along with an environmen-
tal group and a labor union-had standing to challenge the law97 and that
it was "ripe" for adjudication, 98 the Court held Price-Anderson did not
violate their Fifth Amendment due process rights. 99 The Court found
Price-Anderson to be a "classic example of an economic regulation,"'1°
which should be upheld unless it can be established that Congress' judg-
ment was "demonstrably arbitrary or irrational."'' 01 Based on this review
standard, the Court found it was appropriate for Congress to encourage
the construction of nuclear power facilities in the manner set forth in the
Price-Anderson Act.10 2
The Court rejected the district court's assertion' 0 3 that the $560 mil-
lion damage limitation was arbitrary and not rationally related to the po-
tential damages caused by a possible nuclear accident. Instead, the Court
found the dollar limitation a reasonable starting point given that the risk
of a nuclear accident was very small, and that in the event an accident
did occur, it was likely Congress would take further action ameliorating
the hardship (as Congress had done with respect to previous natural di-
sasters). 1' 4 The Court also disagreed with the district court's determina-
tion that liability limitations in the Price-Anderson Act would encourage
irresponsibility, pointing to the rigorous regulatory review process and
the still significant damages a power plant owner would face in the event
of an accident. 10 5
Finally, the Court disagreed with the lower court's conclusion that
the Price-Anderson Act should not survive scrutiny under the Due Pro-
cess Clause because it failed to provide injured parties with a satisfactory
quid pro quo to compensate for the forfeiture of their common law
rights. 10 6 First, the Court noted "it is not at all clear that the Due Process
Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme
either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable sub-
96 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
97 Id. at 72-81.
98 Id. at 81-82.
99 Id. at 82.
100 Id. at 83.
101 Il at 84.'
102 Id.
103 Carolina Environmental Study Group v. Duke Power Co., 431 F. Supp. 203, 222
(W.D.N.C. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
104 438 U.S. at 84-85.
105 Id at 87.
106 Id. at 87-88 (citations omitted).
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stitute remedy."' 07 In so doing, the Court observed in a footnote that the
Second Employers' Liability Cases stood for the proposition that "[o]ur
cases have clearly established that '[a] person has no property, no vested
interest, in any rule of the common law.'"" 08
Ultimately, however, the Court failed to resolve whether or not a
quid pro quo was required to satisfy the Due Process Clause, since it
found the requisite substitute remedy had been effectuated by the Price-
Anderson Act.' 09 The Court noted the Price-Anderson Act provided a
secure source of funds to victims harmed by a nuclear accident, man-
dated a waiver of the owner's common law defenses, and allowed claims
to be satisfied without resulting in an inequitable "race to the court-
house." 110 In this respect, the Court observed that the Price-Anderson
Act was somewhat comparable to the New York worker's compensation
statte"1' upheld in New York Central R. Co. v. White,112 and the Federal
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 13 upheld in
Crowell v. Benson 14 (both being upheld against due process chal-
lenges). 115 The Court also rejected the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment
equal protection claim, finding that this argument "largely track[ed] and
duplicate[d] those made in support of the due process claim." 116
107 Id. at 88.
108 Id. at 88, n.32, (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)). In the same
footnote, the Court also quoted from its 1929 decision in Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929),
for the principle that "[t]he 'Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the
abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative ob-
ject."' Id.
109 Id. at 88.
110 Id. at 90.
111 1913 N.Y. Laws 816; 1914 N.Y. Laws 41, 316.
112 243 U.S. 188 (1917). In New York Central R. Co. v. White, the Court found the New
York workers' compensation law to be "reasonable" and in conformance with "natural jus-
tice." Id. at 203. The Court specifically reserved the question of whether New York could
have eliminated the parties' common law rights without setting up an alternative compensation
scheme: "it perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish all rights of action on the
one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting up something adequate in their stead.
No such question is here presented." Id. at 201. The New York workers' compensation law
was further amended and upheld against due process challenge in New York Central R. Co. v.
Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919).
113 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
114 285 U.S. 22 (1932), overruled on other grounds, Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs v. Perini North River Assoc., 459 U.S. 297 (1983). In Crowell, the Court
found the Federal Longshoreman and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, requiring employ-
ers to pay reasonable statutory compensation to maritime employees who are disabled or die
from work injuries while on United States navigable waters, to conform to due process re-
quirements since it was reasonable and similar to other workers' compensation schemes. Id. at
41. The Court found the employers' Seventh Amendment claim to be "unavailing" since the
compensation arrangement had previously been governed by maritime law and fell within
Congress' admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 45.
115 438 U.S. at 88.
116 Id. at 93.
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The Court did not separately consider any federalism issues. The
plaintiffs had sought to argue that Price-Anderson "encroaches on sub-
stantial state governmental interests" 117 and should therefore be subject
to an augmented standard of review under the Due Process Clause, but
the Court could find no basis in law for this contention. 118
The Court also did not reach the plaintiffs' argument that the Price-
Anderson Act effectuated an unconstitutional Fifth Amendment "tak-
ing". 119 The Court found that it was not necessary to consider this argu-
ment because in their view the Price-Anderson Act did not withdraw
plaintiffs' ability to bring a claim for an unjust taking under the Tucker
Act.120 In the Court's view, the question as to whether a takings claim
could be established under the Fifth Amendment "is a matter appropri-
ately left for another day."'121
C. SwiNE FLU Acr
In 1976, Congress adopted the Swine Flu Act,' 22 substituting the liability
of the United States under the Federal Torts Claim Act for the liability of
manufacturers, distributors, and volunteer medical personnel in connec-
tion with the administration of the swine flu vaccine.123 Under the Swine
Flu Act, although these program participants are not directly liable to
harmed individuals for personal injury or death, the United States is per-
mitted to seek indemnification from them on the basis of their negligence
or breach of contract. 124
The Swine Flu Act was upheld against constitutional challenge by
district courts in Tennessee (Wolfe v. Merrill National Laboratoriesl25 ),
Oklahoma (Sparks v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.126), and Alabama (Ste-
phens v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.127) in 1977, as well as by the Fifth
117 Id. at 84 n.27.
118 Id
119 Id. at 94. The Fifth Amendment "takings" clause provides that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
120 438 U.S. at 94. The Tucker Act, inter alia, waives United States sovereign immunity
for claims founded on statutes, regulations, contracts or provisions of the Constitution that
create substantive rights to money damages. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
121 438 U.S. at 94 n.39.
122 Swine Flu Act, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113,42 U.S.C. § 247b (1976) (repealed
1978).
123 Under the Swine Flu Act, although the procedures of the Federal Tort Claims Act are
made applicable to suits against the United States, the Act did not limit a plaintiffs theory of
recovery to negligence alone. See 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(2)(A); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674
(1976). Instead, the United States is made liable upon any basis which would have been
available against the program participant under applicable state law, "including negligence,
strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty." 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(2)(A)() (1976).
124 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(7) (1976).
125 433 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
i26 431 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Okl. 1977).
127 No. 77-L-0274-S (W.D. Ala., June 3, 1977).
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Circuit in Ducharme v. Merrill-National Laboratories128 the following
year. The courts found the Swine Flu Act to involve "the area of social
and economic welfare" and applied a rational basis standard of review in
rejecting plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection
arguments. 129 Applying this standard, the Fifth Circuit in Ducharme
concluded that "the procedure established under the [Swine Flu] Act is
rationally related to achieving the goal of assuring interstate distribution
of the swine flu vaccine."' 30 The court also rejected the plaintiff's tak-
ings assertion, finding the law did not apply retroactively to remove any
"vested" property rights from claimants. 131
The Ducharme and Sparks courts also rejected the contention that
the Swine Flu Act violated plaintiffs' Seventh Amendment rights, hold-
ing the United States as the "sovereign" was not subject to the Seventh
Amendment. 132 In Sparks, the Oklahoma district court observed, "it is
axiomatic that if a cause of action against [the sovereign] can be abol-
ished, the jury trial of that action is also abolished. The elemental fact is
that suits against the sovereign were unknown at common law."'133 The
court noted that similar arguments had been raised-and rejected-in the
context of the Federal Drivers Act. 134
In Sparks, the district court further rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the Swine Flu Act violated the Tenth Amendment 135 by calling for
the assistance of state and local governments. The court noted that in our
modem economy it was appropriate for the federal and state govern-
ments to work together in responding to common problems, so long as
the legislation does not impose a "coercion on the states,"'136 and in the
case of the Swine Flu Act, the law specifically sanctioned voluntary co-
operation by state governments concerning health matters.' 37
128 574 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978).
129 Id. at 1310. In Sparks, the court stated, "the statutory classification comes here
clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and it 'will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it."' 431 F. Supp. at 418. In Wolfe, the court adopted
the reasoning of Sparks to the extent necessary to reach the issues raised by the plaintiff, but
went on to observe that it need not necessarily reach the constitutional issues since the plain-
tiff, a doctor, had voluntarily consented to the legal limitations of the Swine Flu Act. 433 F.
Supp. at 236, 237-238.
130 574 F.2d at 1311.
131 Id. at 1310.
132 574 F.2d at 1311; 431 F. Supp. at 418.
133 431 F. Supp. at 418.
134 Id. at 416.
135 See infra note 427.
136 Sparks, 431 F. Supp. at 419.
137 Id. at 420.
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D. ATOMIC TESTING LIABiLrry AcT
The 1984 Atomic Testing Liability Act ("Atomic Testing Liability Act")
made an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act the exclusive remedy for injury or death due to exposure to radiation
from atomic weapons testing programs carried out by government con-
tractors. 138 The law was found to be constitutional by the First Circuit in
Hammond v. United States139 in 1986 and by the Ninth Circuit in In re
Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation140 in 1987.
As was the case with the Swine Flu Act, the courts readily disposed
of plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment takings assertion, citing New York Cen-
tral R. Co. v. White for the proposition that "[n]o person has a vested
interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain un-
changed for his benefit."'141 In Hammond, the First Circuit concluded
that a takings claim would not lie unless and until a harmed party has a
"final, unreviewable judgment.' 42
As for the Fifth Amendment due process challenge, like other tort
reforms, the courts use a rational basis review standard to conclude the
Atomic Testing Liability Act was reasonably designed to encourage fed-
eral contractors to participate in the nuclear weapons program. 143 In
reaching this conclusion, the courts in Hammond and In re Consolidated
United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation stated that the Due Process
Clause permitted Congress to choose from a range of alternative com-
pensation schemes when it preempted state tort law:
[A]lthough Congress could have relieved the independent contrac-
tors of their burden of defending suits for radiation and still provided
those injured by radiation a more generous substitute compensation
scheme, we cannot say that Congress' choice of means was without any
rational basis .... When the program began Congress could have man-
dated that all tort claims arising from it be litigated through the [Federal
Tort Claims Act]. 144
138 Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1837, 42 U.S.C. § 2212 (1994). The statute provides
"[tihe remedy against the United States provided by [the FTCA] as appropriate, for injury, loss
of property, personal injury, or death shall apply to any civil action for injury, loss of property,
personal injury, or death due to exposure to radiation based on acts or omissions by a contrac-
tor in carrying out an atomic weapons testing program under a contract with the United
States." Id. § 2212(b)(1).
139 786 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1986).
140 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987).
141 Hammond, 786 F.2d at 12 & 820 F.2d at 989 (quoting New York Central R. Co. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188, 198).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 12-14 (considering Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection chal-
lenges); In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F.2d at 989-91
(rejecting both procedural and substantive due process challenges).
144 Id. at 991 (citing Hammond, 786 F.2d at 14).
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The First Circuit in Hammond also disposed of a number of other
constitutional challenges to the Atomic Testing Liability Act, including
the assertion that the law violated the Seventh and Tenth Amend-
ments.145 Using the same reasoning developed in upholding the Swine
Flu Act (and the Federal Drivers Act before that), the Court found the
Seventh Amendment did not apply to federal laws involving the sover-
eign, concluding, "[w]hen the United States abolishes a cause of action
and then sets up a separate administrative remedy against itself, as it has
here, the seventh amendment does not require that it must also provide a
jury trial. ' ' 146
Finally, in Hammond, the plaintiff asserted the Atomic Testing Lia-
bility Act improperly invaded state prerogatives in light of the Court's
1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.147 In rejecting this
argument, the court responded that not only was National League of
Cites distinguishable because it involved a limitation on Congress' com-
merce authority (rather than the war powers authority implicated by the
Atomic Testing Liability Act), but that National League of Cities had
been overruled by the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority.148
E. 1988 AmNDmNTs TO THE PRIcE-ANDERSON Acr
In 1988, Price-Anderson was amended for a third time pursuant to the
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 (the "1988 Amendments"). 149
Under the 1988 Amendments, claims arising from "nuclear incidents"
were considered to be exclusively federal causes of action.' 50 Such ac-
tions, denoted as "public liability actions," are to be based on the applica-
ble state law where the nuclear accident occurred except to the extent
such law is inconsistent with federal law (e.g., Price-Anderson). 151 The
1988 Amendments also provided for consolidation of all claims in the
145 786 F.2d at 15. In addition to the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Amendment arguments
discussed supra, the court rejected claims that the law was unconstitutional because it was an
"unexpected law," violated the Ninth Amendment (preserving all unenumerated rights for the
people), right of access to the courts, and prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id.
146 Id.
147 ld. at 15 (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Congress lacks authority to impose
wage and hour standards on state and local government employees).
148 Hammond, 786 F.2d at 15 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
149 Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1994)).
150 The 1966 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act provided for transfer to federal dis-
trict court of all actions arising out of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(n)(2)(1994). The failure of such definition to apply to the Three Mile Island accident
was seen as a significant impetus for Price-Anderson's 1988 expansion. See S. Rep. No. 100-
218, at 13 (1987).
151 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (1994).
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federal district court where the accident occurred, and were made to ap-
ply retroactively to any claim pending on the date of enactment.' 5 2
The constitutionality of the 1988 Amendments was upheld by the
Seventh Circuit in O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,153 and by
the Third Circuit in In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. I/154 and In re
TMI.155 These cases principally considered two constitutional ques-
tions-whether the 1988 Amendments conferred jurisdiction in the fed-
eral courts in violation of Article I of the Constitution,' 56 and whether
the retroactive nature of the law violated Fifth Amendment due process.
With regard to the Article I issue, O'Conner found that the 1988
Amendments did not "merely create federal jurisdiction for a state claim,
rather [they] affirmatively 'embodie[d] substantive federal policies.""'157
O'Conner further noted that rather than "adopt[ing] in wholesale fashion
state law,"'158 the Price-Anderson Act created a "new and entirely federal
cause of action."' 159 In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. H reached the
same conclusion, finding that "the Act while relying for definition upon
state law elements, contains the federal components necessary to survive
the constitutional challenge."'160 The court went on to note there were
numerous features of federal law for a court to consider in a Price-Ander-
son Act public liability action, such as whether the cause of action re-
sulted from a nuclear incident, the waiver of state law defenses, the
limited availability of punitive damages, and whether the action is other-
wise inconsistent with federal law.' 61
As for the due process challenge, O'Conner rejected the contention
that it was irrational to apply the 1988 Amendments to circumstances
other than the Three Mile Island nuclear accident.' 62 After noting the
152 Id § 2219(n)(2).
153 13 F.3d 1090 (7' Cir. 1994).
154 940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991).
155 89 F.3d 1106 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Aldrich v. General Pub. Utils. Corp.,
U.S. _; 117 S.Ct. 739; 136 L. Ed. 2d 678; 65 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. 1997).
156 Article I of the Constitution provides that federal judicial power extends to cases
"arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under
their authority." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
157 13 F.3d at 1099. In considering the Article III issue, O'Conner reviewed prior
Supreme Court precedent such as Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738
(1824), and Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). The court read
these cases as establishing that "more than a jurisdictional grant is required for a matter to
'arise under' the Constitution or laws of the United States," but that "where Congress has the
authority to legislate in a given area and substantively does so, a grant of federal subject matter
jurisdiction will survive an Article III challenge." 13 F.3d at 1098-99 (citations omitted).
158 13 F.3d at 1100.
159 Id
160 940 F.2d at 857.
161 Id.
162 In O'Conner, plaintiff alleged he had been overexposed to radioactive materials in his
position as a pipe fitter for Commonwealth Edison nuclear facility. Id. at 1093.
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plaintiff must overcome a "strong presumption"' 163 of constitutionality,
the court found retroactive application of the removal and consolidation
provisions of the 1988 Amendments could provide advantages and effi-
ciencies to a broad class of nuclear incidents above and beyond the Three
Mile Island accident. 164
In TMIF65 the court applied a straightforward rational basis constitu-
tional test, finding the 1988 Amendments furthered Congress' stated
goals of" 'uniformity, equity, and efficiency in the disposition of public
liability claims' arising from nuclear accidents."'166 The Third Circuit
found that retroactive application applied the Price-Anderson Act to all
parties and therefore eliminated the potential for inconsistent results be-
tween jurisdictions. 167 Furthermore, TMI asserted the 1988 Amendments
promoted efficiency by allowing consolidation of all nuclear accident
cases in a single forum, remedying what the court referred to as "proce-
dural problems plaguing the TMI cases."'1 68
F. WESTFALL ACT
In reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Westfall v. Erwin169 limit-
ing federal employees' immunity from tort,170 Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Employees' Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(the "Westfall Act"). 171 The Westfall Act broadened the Federal Drivers
Act to provide for substitution of the United States as a defendant in
actions arising from torts committed by federal employees acting within
the scope of their employment, and applied retroactively to cases pend-
ing on the date of enactment. 172
Rather than challenging the general limitations on liability set forth
in the Westfall Act, plaintiffs focused on provisions applying to pending
163 Id. at 1102.
164 Id.
165 In TMI, plaintiffs asserted that retroactive application of the 1988 Amendments vio-
lated their due process rights by requiring resort to Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limita-
tions (rather than Mississippi's six-year statute) thereby resulting in a dismissal of their action.
89 F.3d at 1110-11.
166 1d at 1113, (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-104, pt. 3, at 18 (1987)).
167 Id. at 1113.
168 L. at 1114. In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. II also rejected due process and equal
protection claims as well as other "collateral" arguments relating to federalism and state sover-
eignty concerns. 940 F.2d at 860-61. See also O'Conner, 13 F.3d at 1102, n. 10. ("[tlhe
removal of cases arising under [the laws of the United States] from state into federal courts
is... no invasion of state domain." ).
169 484 U.S. 292 (1988) (conduct by federal officials must be discretionary in nature as
well as within the scope of their employment to enjoy absolute state-law tort immunity).
170 Arbour v. Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416 (6"h Cir. 1990).
171 Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2679
(1994)).
172 Id. The Westfall Act amended the Federal Torts Claims Act.
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actions. However, claims that the Act's retroactivity provisions violated
Fifth Amendment due process rights were rejected by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Sowell v. American Cyanimid;173 the Sixth Circuit in Arbour v.
Jenkins;174 and the Tenth Circuit in Salmon v. Shwarz.'75 In each case,
the courts found that "a legal claim [for tortious injury] affords no defi-
nite or enforceable property right until reduced to a final judgment,"' 76
and were therefore not subject to constitdtional protection. In Salmon the
court also argued that any disadvantages to plaintiffs were offset by the
legal benefits available under the Westfall Act, noting "there are advan-
tages afforded under the [Federal Torts Claims Act, such as] the adminis-
trative claim procedure for more expeditious resolutions, and the liability
of the government in lieu of the risk that individual defendants may be
judgment proof."'177
IV. THE THIRD WAVE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC OR
PUSHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENVELOPE?
The third and most recent wave of federal tort reforms was initiated in
the 1990's, when Congress enacted several narrowly tailored laws pro-
viding specific liability exemptions; such as a statute of repose for gen-
eral aviation, exemptions from ordinary negligence for food donors and
volunteers, caps on liability for rail passenger providers, and limitations
on liability for medical implant suppliers who meet certain contractual
and other product specifications, and limitations on liability in Y2K ac-
tions. 178 Due to the relatively narrow scope of these laws, they have not
yet been applied in a manner giving rise to constitutional challenge.' 79
173 888 F.2d 802 (11' Cir. 1989).
174 903 F.2d at 416.
'75 948 F.2d 1131 (10 Cir. 1991).
176 Salmon, 924 F.2d at 1143.
177 Id.
178 See infra nn.174, 184, 216, 228 & 244. Other recent examples of federal tort reforms
include (1) 49 U.S.C. § 28102 (1994) (enacted in 1990) (limiting passenger rail liability for
Virginia commuter lines to $200 million per accident in the District of Columbia along with
requiring such railways to maintain minimum liability coverage of $200 million); (2) Federal
Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1787(c)(3)(A) (1994) (enacted in 1987) (limiting damages for
lost profits, lost opportunity, and pain and suffering stemming from the liquidation of federal
credit unions) (enacted in 1987); (3) National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of
1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1-34 (1994) (providing no-fault compensation scheme for injuries
resulting from child vaccines and eliminating most forms of state law liability for vaccine
manufacturers and administrators); and (4) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9612(e) & 9658 (a) (1994)
(providing that bringing Superfund claim does not constitute a waiver of rights under state law
and substituting federal for state statute of limitations). See also Year 2000 Information and
Readiness Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 note (1998) (preempting state contract actions and
evidentiary rules stemming from the dissemination of information concerning the Year 2000
computer problems).
179 See infra n.456.
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Congress has also considered a number of far broader liability reforms
involving areas such as products liability, medical malpractice and to-
bacco liability. 180 Collectively, this third wave of reforms raise a number
of constitutional issues which have not been fully addressed in either the
first or second wave of federal tort laws.
A. RECENTLY ENACTED FEDERAL TORT REFORMS
1. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994
The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (the "General Aviation
Act")' 8 ' provides for an 18-year federal statute of repose for manufactur-
ers of "general aviation aircraft"'1 2 and their component parts. As such,
the law operates to prevent plaintiffs from bringing civil actions for death
or injury or damage to property stemming from an accident against a
manufacturer of a general aviation aircraft or component part which is
more than 18 years old. The statute operates on a "rolling basis," so that
if an original part is replaced, the new part would have a new 18-year
statute of repose commencing with its replacement.18 3
The General Aviation Act does not apply in cases in which: (1) the
manufacturer has misrepresented safety information to the Federal Avia-
tion Administration; (2) the claimant was a passenger for purposes of
receiving emergency medical treatment; (3) the claimant was not aboard
the aircraft; and (4) actions are brought pursuant to written warranties.18 4
The General Aviation Act is "one-way preemptive," that is to say it only
supersedes state laws where there are no statutes of repose or which pro-
vide for a longer statute of repose.'85
The General Aviation Act stems from concerns that the United
States' general aviation industry was declining in part due to excessive
liability burdens and the costs of defending so-called frivolous lawsuits.
180 See infra notes 241, 261 & 273. A number of other tort reform proposals may be on
the congressional agenda which are not discussed in detail herein. See e.g., Trade and Profes-
sional Association Free Flow of Information Act of 1997, H.R. 1542 & S. 1135, 105' Cong.
(1997) (providing expanded liability protections for non-profit organizations); and Auto
Choice Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2021 & S. 625, 105'h Cong. (1997) (preempting state auto-
mobile liability law to permit motorists to of the ability to seek non-economic damages); Fair-
ness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998, H.R. 3905, 105d' Cong. (1998) (preempting state
law concerning liability for asbestos to provide an administrative procedure subject to a variety
of caps and limitations on liability).
181 Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552-54 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note
(1994)).
182 General Aviation Act § 2(c). In the scope of this provision a "general aviation air-
craft" is defined as aircraft of less than 20 seats not engaged in scheduled passenger carrying
operations.
183 Id. §§ 2(a)(2) & 3.
184 a § 2(b). In excluding "written" warranties, the law would presumably apply to su-
persede any implied warranties which may have applied beyond the statute of repose period.
185 It. § 2(d).
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In their report on the legislation, the House Transportation Committee
concluded that "[a]n important factor in the decline of general aviation
manufacturing has been the industry's product liability costs, which have
increased from $24 million in 1978 to more than $200 million a year in
recent years."'186 An additional factor justifying Congress' interest was
the fact that the general aviation industry was considered uniquely sus-
ceptible to federal tort relief because it was otherwise subject to" 'cradle
to grave'federal regulatory oversight"-including FAA approval of air-
craft designs, federal licensing of pilots, mechanics and maintenance fa-
cilities, federal regulation of air routes and fuel handling, and FAA and
National Transportation Safety Board review of aircraft accidents. 187
The liability law which was ultimately enacted was far less compre-
hensive than previous versions of the legislation. As originally intro-
duced by Senator Kassebaum (R-KA) and approved by the Senate
Commerce Committee in 1986, general aviation reform would have es-
tablished a uniform federal standard of negligence for general aviation
accidents; mandated comparative negligence; altered the rules of evi-
dence in general aviation cases (i.e., to explicitly provide that plaintiffs
may not introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures); set forth a
federal standard for the award of punitive damages; created a two-year
federal statute of limitations for bringing liability actions, and allowed
automatic removal to federal courts as well as providing for a federal
statute of repose (originally sought to be 12 years). 188
Due to the controversy engendered by such a wide-ranging ap-
proach,'8 9 by 1993 the bill's sponsors settled on seeking a single re-
form-the imposition of a 15-year statute of repose. In order to obtain
the consensus necessary to obtain clearance for consideration and ap-
proval in the Senate, the bill was further modified to extend the statute of
repose period to 18-years, and exceptions were added to exempt cases
involving misrepresentations to the FAA and written warranties, as well
as persons injured on the ground and pursuant to medical evacuation. 190
186 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 2 (1994). Proponents had noted that production
of general aviation aircrafts by domestic manufacturers had declined from 17,000 units in 1979
to 954 units in 1993. This in turn was asserted to have led to a direct loss of 20,000 aviation
jobs and an indirect loss of another 80,000 jobs in related industries. Id
187 Id. at 5-6.
188 See S. 2794, 99th Cong. (1986).
189 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 101-303, at 2 (1990) (Senate Judiciary Committee issued an
adverse report on general aviation legislation, concluding, inter alia, that "[t]he General Avia-
tion Accident Liability Standards Act [S. 640] should not be passed by the Senate and enacted
into law. The bill has not been proven to be necessary and would represent an unwise policy
decision on the part of the Senate, if adopted. Further, a number of the specific substantive
provisions of the bill are so problematic that the entire bill is fatally flawed.").
190 The House version of the legislation further clarified that it would only apply to limit
suits brought against general aviation manufacturers in their capacity as manufacturers. See
General Aviation Act, § 2(a).
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2. Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act
The Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act (the "Food Dona-
tion Act"), 19 1 enacted in 1996, exempts persons who donate 192 food and
grocery products to nonprofits193 for distribution to the needy, as well as
the non-profits themselves, from civil or criminal liability in connection
with food which is "apparently wholesome" and grocery products which
are "apparently fit" (i.e., meeting applicable quality and labeling
standards). 194
The Food Donation Act allows persons to donate food and grocery
products which do not meet applicable quality and labeling standards
without fear of liability so long as the nonprofit organization is so in-
formed, agrees to remedy the defect, and has the knowledge to do so. 195
The law also protects persons who permit food to be "gleaned" (har-
vested from their land free of charge) from civil or criminal liability aris-
ing from the gleaner, except in cases of gross negligence or intentional
misconduct. 196  The Food Donation Act does not include a specific
clause stating that it is one-way preemptive, however, it is written in such
a manner that it provides only relief from liability in specified situations,
and therefore does not appear to create any liability where gross negli-
gence or intentional misconduct occur except as otherwise provided
under state law. 197
Proponents of the Food Donation Act asserted it was needed to pro-
vide a minimum federal floor of liability protection in order to encourage
the various forms of food donation activity. 98 While it was acknowl-
edged that all states had adopted some form of liability protection to food
donors, supporters believed these laws were inconsistent and created
confusion, particularly for large national food donors. 199
191 Pub. L. No. 104-210, 110 Stat. 3011 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1791 (West Supp.
1998)).
192 The Food Donation Act applies to persons who donate as well as "glean" food, with
"gleaner" defined to mean "a person who harvests for free distribution to the needy ... an
agricultural crop that has been donated by the owner." Id. §§ 1791(b)(5) & (c)(1).
193 The Food Donation Act defines "nonprofit organization" as an entity that (A) is oper-
ated for religious, charitable, or educational purposes; and (B) does not provide net earnings or
operate in a manner that benefits any of its officers, employees, or shareholders. Id. § 1791(b)
(9).
194 Id. §§ 1791(b)(1), (b)(2),(c)(1) & (c)(2).
195 Id. § 1791(d).
196 Id. § 1791(d).
197 The operative provisions of the law provide that persons, gleaners, and nonprofit orga-
nizations "shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability" arising from a specified set of
circumstances. Id. §§ 1791(c)(1) & (c)(2).
198 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-661, at 3 (1996).
199 See, e.g., The Good Samaritan Food Donation Act, Hearing on H.R. 2428 Before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education, Training and Life-Long Learning of the House
Comm. on Economic and Educational Opportunities, 104th Cong., 5 (1996) (statement of Rep.
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The Food Donation Act was based on a model good samaritan stat-
ute which Congress adopted in 1990.2 0 In March of 1996, a conference
committee declined to extend the law into a federal mandate as part of
the Agriculture bill because of stated federalism and jurisdictional con-
cerns. 20 1 However, in the wake of the death of the proposal's principal
supporter, Rep. Bill Emerson (R-MO), the legislation received renewed
attention and was able to easily pass the House and Senate in substan-
tially the same form as the introduced version.202
3. Volunteer Protection Act of 1997
The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (the "Volunteer Protection
Act"),203 provides a variety of protections from liability to individuals
who volunteer for nonprofit organizations2 4 or government agencies. 205
The principal form of protection provided by the Act insulates volun-
teers206 from actions for harm caused by ordinary negligence (i.e., not
caused by willful or criminal conduct, gross negligence, reckless miscon-
duct or a conscious, or flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of
others).20 7 This protection from civil liability does not apply to volun-
teers acting outside the scope of their responsibility, volunteers acting
without a required license, certification, or authorization, or harm caused
by a motor vehicle.208
Danner) ("[w]hile each of the 50 states have Good Samaritan legislation in place, the level of
protection differs and the liability concerns of the national and regional donors are not uni-
formly addressed. Adoption of this bill would eliminate this disparity and facilitate greater
support of private sector feeding programs... :').
200 National and Community Service Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12571, 12671-12673
(1994).
201 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-494, at 405 (1996).
202 The Senate adopted amendments which clarified that "gross negligence" included a
failure to act and that the law did not supersede state or local health regulations covering
nonprofit organizations. See 142 Cong. Rec. S9532 -33 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996).
203 Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14501- 14505 (West
Supp. 11 1997)).
204 "Nonprofit organization" is defined to include any organization exempt from federal
taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code as well as any not-for-profit
organized and conducted for the public benefit and operated primarily for charitable, civic,
educational, religious, welfare or health purposes, so long as the group does not practice any
action constituting a federal hate crime. Id. § 14505(4).
205 The Volunteer Protection Act does not provide any direct liability protections to the
nonprofit organizations or government agencies. Id. § 14503(c).
206 "Volunteer" is defined to mean an individual (including a director or officer) perform-
ing services for a "nonprofit organization" or a governmental entity who does not receive
compensation (other than reasonable expenses) in excess of $500 per year. Id. § 14505 (6).
207 lI § 14503(a)(3).
208 Id. §§ 14503(a)(1), (2) & (3). The Act also excludes from liability protection any
specific misconduct constituting a crime of violence or international terrorism, hate crime,
sexual offense, civil rights violation, or which is caused by the influence of alcohol or drugs in
violation of state law as well as volunteers performing services for groups responsible for
federal hate crimes (e.g., crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion,
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In addition, the Volunteer Protection Act provides special protec-
tions to volunteers for actions involving punitive damages and actions
involving joint and several liability with respect to volunteers acting
within the scope of their employment. 20 9 Punitive damages may only be
allowed if the plaintiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
the harm was caused by willful or criminal misconduct, or a conscious,
flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of others.210 Joint and several
liability by volunteers is eliminated for "non-economic" damages (e.g.,
pain and suffering). Instead, under the Volunteer Protection Act volun-
teers are only responsible for paying non-economic damages to the ex-
tent of their "percentage of responsibility" (as determined by the trier of
fact).211
The Volunteer Protection Act is one-way preemptive, superseding
state laws "except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with [the]
Act, except that [the] Act shall not preempt any state law that provides
additional protections from liability relating to volunteers .... -212 How-
ever, the Volunteer Protection Act permits the operation of certain state
laws requiring that nonprofit organizations operate in a safe and sound
manner, namely, laws requiring nonprofit organizations to adopt risk
management procedures (e.g., training volunteers), be subject to respon-
deat superior (i.e., vicarious employer liability for employee negligence),
and have a secure source of funds for victim recovery available.213
sexual orientation, or ethnicity). Id. §§ 14503(f) & 14505(4). (Federal hate crimes are defined
at 28 U.S.C. § 534 note).
209 Unlike the liability protections against acts of ordinary negligence, the Volunteer Pro-
tection Act's limitations on liability for punitive damages and joint and several liability for
non-economic damages are not limited to actions where the volunteer was acting with any
required license or was not caused by a motor vehicle. An additional variation in coverage
concerns the scope of the joint and several liability damage limitations set forth in the Volun-
teer Protection Act. By its terms the provisions prohibiting actions against volunteers for
ordinary negligence and limiting punitive damage actions do not apply to affect civil actions
brought by a nonprofit or governmental entity against their volunteers. There is no such limi-
tation contained in the provisions limiting non-economic damages in joint and several liability
cases. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14503 (a), (c), (e) & 14504.
210 Id. § 14503(e)(1).
211 Id. § 14504(b)(1).
212 Id. § 14502(a). Under some scenarios, determinations regarding the interaction be-
tween state law and the Act could be problematic with regard to tort reforms. Consider a state
such as Idaho where punitive damages may be established by a "preponderance of the evi-
dence," but such awards are limited to "wanton, malicious or outrageous misconduct." Idaho
Code § 6-1604 (1996). In the event of a voluntary liability case in Idaho involving a punitive
damage claim, it would be unclear whether a defendant would be permitted to use the stricter
evidentiary requirement of the Volunteer Protection Act requiring "clear and convincing evi-
dence" to establish punitive damages, while at the same time benefiting from the stricter state
law requirement limiting punitive damages to "outrageous misconduct" (as compared to the
Volunteer Protection Act's seemingly more lenient standard of "flagrant indifference to the
rights or safety of others").
213 Idl §§ 14503(d)(1), (2) & (4).
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States are also permitted to exempt lawsuits brought against volunteers
by police officers and other state and local officials.214 In addition, the
Volunteer Protection Act allows states to enact stand alone legislation
opting out of the new volunteer protection provisions entirely.215
The legislation's supporters asserted that an increase in the number
of lawsuits being brought against volunteers was having a negative im-
pact on volunteerism.216 Proponents also asserted that inconsistencies
between the various state laws were having an adverse impact on na-
tional volunteer organizations. During House floor debate, Judiciary
Chairman Hyde (R-LL) argued that "[tihe Red Cross, for example, would
like to be able to train people.., for disaster relief... and it is impor-
tant that they not have to concern themselves with the checkerboard of
liability laws. In addition, there is a very small insurance market to
cover volunteers. The cost of that insurance becomes prohibitive if it has
to be complicated by a plethora of liability standards from state to
state."
2 17
The Volunteer Protection Act traces its roots to legislation intro-
duced by Rep. Porter (R-IL) in 1987 as H.R. 911 and reintroduced as that
bill number in each succeeding Congress.218 Rather than mandating im-
munity for specified volunteer activity, the approach taken by these bills
was to encourage the states to adopt volunteer liability protection provi-
sions by offering the incentive of a one percent increase in their Social
Security block grants. 219 During the 105th Congress, however, propo-
nents of volunteer liability legislation took a more aggressive approach,
mandating the liability limitations, rather than encouraging them through
214 Id. § 14503(d)(3).
215 Such opt-out authority would only apply to volunteer liability cases where all of the
parties to the proceeding are residents of the state in question. Id. § 14502(b).
216 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-101, pt. 1, at 5-8 (1997). In particular, supporters pointed
to a 1996 report prepared by the Nonprofit Risk Management Center (an organization designed
to meet the insurance and risk management needs of the nonprofit community) in cooperation
with the ABA Section on Business Law which found that there had been a significant increase
in the number of lawsuits brought against volunteers since the mid-1980's, and a study by the
Independent Sector (an organization of foundations, charities, and businesses that tracks non-
profit activities) indicating that the rate of volunteerism had dropped from 54% in 1989 to 48%
in 1993. I. at 5-6 (1997); 143 Cong. Rec. S3861-62 (daily ed. May 1, 1997) (statement of
Sen. Coverdell).
217 143 Cong. Rec. H3101 (daily ed. May 21, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
218 See H.R. 911, 100th Cong. (1987).
219 In 1993, Rep. Porter offered his bill as an amendment to the National Service Trust
Act, and it was approved by the full House after a perfecting amendment offered by Rep. John
Bryant was adopted (providing that as a condition of the volunteer immunity, the states re-
quire-rather than just permit-laws insuring that covered nonprofit organizations operate in a
safe and sound manner). The Bryant amendment was approved by a vote of 239-194, and the
Porter Amendment, as perfected by the Bryant Amendment, was agreed to by a vote of 362-
61. See 139 Cong. Rec. H5376-82, H5422-23 (daily ed. July 28, 1993). The Porter amend-
ment was subsequently dropped in conference with the Senate.
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block grants.220 In order to obtain the consensus needed to pass the bill in
the Senate, the legislation was revised to exclude the nonprofit organiza-
tions themselves from coverage and exempt motor vehicle liability
cases.
22 1
4. Section 161 of the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of
1997
Section 161 of the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (the
"Amtrak Act") 222 provides liability protections relating to the standards
for awarding punitive damages and overall damage awards stemming
from accidents in connection with the provision of rail passenger
transportation. 223
With regard to punitive damages, the Amtrak Act provides that such
damages may only be awarded if a passenger establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the harm resulted from conduct carried out with
a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of others. 224 The
Amtrak Act also limits the aggregate overall damages that may be
awarded to all passengers for all claims (including punitive damages)
from a particular rail accident to $200 million.225
The final law also specifies that Amtrak and other providers of rail
transportation may enter into indemnification agreements allocating fi-
nancial responsibility for passenger accidents.226 This is apparently in-
tended to preserve Amtrak's authority to enter into agreements with track
owners and operators whom Amtrak assumes liability for in the event of
a passenger accident, without resolving the issue of whether such agree-
ments are ultimately enforceable in court.227 In exchange for these vari-
220 See S. 543, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1167, 105th Cong, 1st Sess. (1997).
221 Further modest revisions were made to the bill when the House Judiciary Committee
approved amendments providing that the bill would only apply to causes of action from events
occurring after the bill's effective date and excluding from the bill's coverage volunteers per-
forming services for groups responsible for federal hate crimes. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-101,
pt. 1 at 9, 16 (1997).
222 Pub. L. No. 105-134, § 111 Stat. 2570 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 28103 (West Supp.
1998)).
223 The Amtrak Act is analyzed as a federal tort reform herein because it operates to
supersede state law, since Amtrak is not considered an agency or instrumentality for purposes
of the Federal Torts Claims Act. See Senter v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557 (D.N.J. 1982)
(Amtrak, unlike federal agencies and instrumentalities, found to be subject to punitive damage
liability).
224 49 U.S.C. § 28103(a)(1).
225 ld. § 28103(a)(2). It is unclear how the damage cap is to be apportioned in the event
claims are established which exceed $200 million.
226 Id. § 28103(b).
227 The introduced version of the legislation would have provided that such obligations
"shall be enforceable, notwithstanding any other statutory or common law or public pol-
icy .... This was an effort to overturn a district court decision in National Railroad Passenger
Corp v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 698 F. Supp. 951 (D.C. 1988), vacated, 892 F.2d 1066 (D.C.
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ous protections, the Amtrak Act mandates that Amtrak maintains a total
minimum liability coverage through insurance and self-insurance of at
least $200 million per accident or incident.228 Proponents of passenger
rail liability reforms sought to justify them on the basis that they would
save the taxpayers' money, since Amtrak is a publicly-funded corpora-
tion.22 9 Supporters also observed that there was precedent at the federal
and state level for limiting liability associated with public
transportation. 230
The version of passenger rail liability limitations passed into law
was far narrower than the originally proposed reforms. In addition to
adopting a minimum federal standard for awarding punitive damages,
proponents had initially sought: a non-economic damages cap at an
amount equal to economic damages plus $250,000; a punitive damages
cap at the greater of $250,000 or three times economic damages; and a
mandate of the enforceability of indemnification agreements. 231 The
original version of the bill would have also applied to all potential plain-
tiffs-passengers as well as non-passengers and property owners harmed
by passenger rail accidents. 232 These latter provisions were opposed by
many Democrats,233 and after failing to pass the Senate, were deleted
from the final bill.
5. Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998
The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 ("Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act"), 234 allows suppliers of raw materials and medical im-
plant component parts to be dismissed from product liability actions if
Cir. 1990) (voiding an indemnification agreement between "mtrak and Conrail implicated by a
1987 Chase, Maryland collision as being against public policy). See H.R. 2247, 105th Cong.
§ 401 (1997); H.R. Rep. No. 105-251, at 7, 22 (1997).
228 49 U.S.C. § 28103(c).
229 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-251, at 21 (1997).
230 Id. The report of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure also re-
jected safety concerns raised by the liability limitations, due to the claimed extensive federal
regulatory role: "Railroad safety is subject to regulation by the Federal Railroad Administra-
tion. Under current law, any single violation of a federal safety law or regulation can subject
an individual or a company to a fine from $500 to $10,000-with the maximum increased to
$20,000 for willil violations." Id. at 22.
231 H.R. 2247, 105th Cong. § 401 (1997).
232 Id
233 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-251, at 93-94 (1997) (minority views contending that
reforms initially approved by the Committee were "neither fair nor sensible." In particular, the
views complained that punitive damages should not be linked to the amount of economic loss,
non-economic damages should not be dependent on economic damages, and mandating the
upholding of indemnification agreements would encourage recklessness by the freight
railways).
234 Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-230, 112 Stat. 1519
(1998) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1601-1606) (1998)).
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they meet certain contractual and other product specifications.235 The
concept behind the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act dates from the
product liability bill vetoed by President Clinton during the 104 Con-
gress. That bill included a title exempting medical implant suppliers from
product liability actions so long as they have met certain contractual and
other product specifications.236 Proponents of the Act argued that frivo-
lous suits against implant suppliers, as well as the fear of such lawsuits,
have an adverse impact on the availability of life-saving medical
implants.237
During the 105' Congress, however, proponents agreed to a number
of legislative refinements which narrowed the overall impact of the Act.
Most importantly, rather than permanently barring a liability action
against suppliers who meet these conditions (as the 104' Congress' ver-
sion would have), under the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act, an im-
plant supplier may subsequently be impleaded back into the action if a
claimant or manufacturer can show by clear and convincing evidence
that the supplier's negligence was the actual and proximate cause of the
235 The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 limits the liability under state product
liability law of biomaterials suppliers that directly or indirectly supply component parts or raw
materials for use in the manufacture of an implant, to only those who fail to meet contractual
and other specifications and such conduct was an actual and proximate cause of the harm to
the claimant. Id. § 5(a).
A biomaterials supplier does not receive liability protection under the "failure to meet
contractual specifications" exception if the raw materials or component parts delivered: (1) did
not constitute the product described in the contract; (2) failed to meet any specifications that
were provided to the supplier and not expressly repudiated; (3) failed to meet any specifica-
tions published by the biomaterials supplier, (4) failed to meet any specifications provided to
the manufacturer by the biomaterials supplier, (5) failed to meet any specifications contained
in a master file submitted by the supplier to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
that is currently maintained by the supplier for the purposes of preinarket approval of medical
devices; or (6) failed to meet any specifications included in the submissions for purposes of
premarket approval or review by the FDA provided by the manufacturer to the supplier and
not repudiated by the supplier. Id. § 5(d).
The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 also requires the manufacturer of an
implant to be named a party unless the manufacturer is subject to service of process solely in a
jurisdiction in which the biomaterials supplier is not domiciled or subject to a service of pro-
cess, or if an action against the manufacturer is barred by applicable law. Id. § 6(b).
236 Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-
481 (1996). Provisions to protect biomaterials suppliers were also included in the Senate
Product Liability Proposal during the 105' Congress.
237 Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 872 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1997) (statement of Jorge E. Ramirez, Sales and Marketing Manager,
Hoechst Corp.). Proponents of the Act also argued that the patchwork of fifty separate product
liability laws leads to venue-shopping and confusion and that the system can be improved by
limiting the liability of materials suppliers. Id.
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harm.23s The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act excludes actions in-
volving silicon breast implants completely.239
The dismissal and impleader provisions in the Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act are enforceable through an elaborate set of procedural
mandates. For example, in order to obtain a pre-trial dismissal, the Act
specifies that a defendant may file a motion alleging that it has met the
various legal requirements for dismissal, including the contractual and
other product specifications.240 While the motion is pending, the Bio-
materials Access Assurance Act limits discovery and requires that state
courts rule on the motion based on the pleadings and affidavits before
it.241 It also sets forth rules for the issuance of summary judgments and
stays.24 2 Post-trial motions to implead are also subject to limited discov-
238 See supra note 235 at § 7. In order to implead a supplier back into the action, a
manufacturer or a claimant must file a motion within 90 days after entry of a final judgment.
239 Id. § 3(2)(D)(iii). The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act also excludes actions in-
volving: (1) health care providers where the sale or use of an implant is incidental to the
transaction and where the essence of the transaction is the furnishing of judgment, skill, or
services; and (2) a person acting in the capacity of a manufacturer, seller, or biomaterials
supplier. Id. §§ 3(2)(D)(i) & (ii).
240 Id. § 6(a). Grounds for the motion to dismiss include that the defendant is: (1) a
biomaterials supplier, and (2) is not a manufacturer, or a seller of the implant or it has not been
established that it supplied raw materials or component parts in violation of the contractual
requirements or specifications.
241 Id. § 6(c). The Act specifies a number of rules pertaining to the motion to dismiss.
For example, in a proceeding on a motion to dismiss, the defendant may submit an affidavit
demonstrating that it has not included the implant on a list filed with the Secretary of Health
and Human Services. L § 6(c)(2)(A). The claimant may then submit an affidavit demonstrat-
ing that the Secretary of Health and Human services has issued a declaration with respect to
the defendant and the implant or demonstrating that the defendant is liable as a seller of the
implant. Id. § 6(c)(2)(B). If a defendant files a motion to dismiss, no discovery will be per-
mitted in connection to the action that is the subject of the motion, other than discovery neces-
sary to determine a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction until the court rules on the motion
to dismiss based on the affidavits submitted by the parties. Id. § 6(c)(1)(A). If a defendant
files a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the biomaterials supplier did not supply raw
material or component parts in violation of contractual requirements or specifications, the
court may permit discovery that is limited to issues relevant to the pending motion to dismiss
or the jurisdiction of the court. Id. § 6(c)(1)(B). Unless the defendant is demonstrated to be a
manufacturer or seller of the implant, the court will consider the defendant to be a biomaterials
supplier who is not subject to an action for harm to a claimant caused by an implant, other than
an action relating to liability for a violation of contractual requirements or specifications. Id.
§ 6(c)(3)(A). The court is required to grant a motion to dismiss any action that asserts liability
of the defendant on the grounds that the defendant is not a manufacturer or seller unless the
claimant submits a valid affidavit demonstrating that the defendant is liable as a manufacturer
or a seller. Id § 6(c)(3)(B). The court is required to rule on a motion to dismiss solely on the
basis of the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties. Id § 6(c)(3). If the court deter-
mines that the pleadings and affidavits raise genuine issues of material facts with respect to a
motion concerning contractual requirements and specifications, the court may deem the motion
to dismiss to be a motion for summary judgment. Id. § 6(c)(4).
242 Id. §§ 6(d) & 5(b)(3)(D). Under the Act, a biomaterials supplier is entitled to sum-
mary judgment only if the court finds no genuine issue of material fact as to the legal require-
ments for dismissal. Discovery prior to a ruling on a summary judgment motion is limited to
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ery and the Act provides further opportunity for the supplier to supple-
ment the record before any trial on the merits may proceed.243
6. Y2K Act
The most recent as well as wide ranging tort reform enacted by Congress
is the Y2K Act signed into law by President Clinton on July 20, 1999.244
The law provides liability relief for defendants in legal actions stemming
from Year 2000 computer failures (e.g., where computer software or
hardware fails to process a two digit code of 00 as being the year 2000)
by enacting a number of substantive and procedural provisions which
preempt state liability law. The law limits the liability exposure of Y2K
defendants, and is intended to clarify the legal rules applicable to such
actions, thereby, in the proponents' words, "reduc[ing] the potential for
frivolous lawsuits" 245 and "increas[ing] the likelihood that the entity who
bears responsibility for the Y2K compliance will work quickly to fix the
problem and reduce damages. '246
The law limits punitive damage claims in Y2K actions by specify-
ing that they must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence," 247 and
capping the amount of such claims that may be brought against "small
business" defendants (defined as individuals having a net worth of less
than $500,000 and businesses with fewer than 50 employees) 248 at the
lesser of 3 times compensatory damages or $250,000. The cap does not
apply where the defendant acted with specific intent to injure.249 The
legislation also provides generally that defendants are only liable for
their proportionate share of liability (in lieu of the common law rule of
joint and several liability). This preemptive rule does not apply (i) in
establishing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the legal requirements of
dismissal. In response to a claimant's petition for a declaration, the court is required to stay all
proceedings with respect to a defendant until the Secretary makes a final decision as to
whether the defendant is a manufacturer and may incur liability.
243 Id. §§ 7(c) & 7(b)(1).
244 Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 6601 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17 (1999)).
245 H.R. Rep. No. 106-131, pt. 1, at 14 (1999).
246 Itd
247 Id. § 5(a).
248 lId § 5(b)(2). Section 5(c) of the Y2K Act contains an absolute prohibition on the
award of punitive damages in a Y2K action against a "government entity." Because of con-
cern that this would protect public, but not private, universities, the Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act for Fiscal Year 2000 amended Section 5 of the Y2K Act to prohibit the award of
punitive damages against all institutions of higher education. Consolidated Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 311, 113 Stat. 151 (1999). (The provision wili
not apply to an institution of higher education if the Y2K failure in the Y2K action occurred in
a computer-based student financial aid system of that institution of higher education, and the
institution: (1) has not passed Y2K data exchange testing with the Department of Education or
(2) is not or was not in the process of performing data exchange testing with the Department of
Education at the time the Department terminates such testing.).
249 Id. § 5(b).
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cases brought by consumers who sue individually, rather than as part of a
larger class; or (ii) where the defendant acted with specific intent to in-
jure the plaintiff or knowingly committed fraud. 250
The legislation also alters a number of statutory and common law
rules in contract and tort actions involving Y2K claims. It mandates
strict enforcement of all contractual terms, unless such enforcement is
inconsistent with state statutory law, or the state common law doctrine of
unconscionability, including adhesion, in effect on January 1, 1999.251
The Act also specifically provides that damage limitations provided for
in contracts relating to Y2K legal claims are strictly enforceable. 252 The
Y2K Act further specifically codifies mitigation of damage requirements
by providing that damage awards must exclude compensation for dam-
ages the plaintiff could reasonably have avoided in light of any disclo-
sure or other information of which the plaintiff was or reasonably should
have been aware. 253 The law also codifies the so-called "economic loss"
rule, which prohibits tort plaintiffs from seeking economic or conse-
quential damages (e.g., lost profits stemming from a Y2K failure) unless
such damages are permitted by contract or they result from damage to
personal or real property.254
In an effort to prevent states from enacting laws making it easier to
sue perceived "deep pocket" corporate defendants in Y2K cases than in
ordinary liability cases, the Act "freezes" certain aspects of state law into
effect. Thus, for example, if a Y2K action for breach or repudiation of
contract is brought, the bill specifies that state law doctrine on the doc-
trines of "impossibility" and "commercial impracticability" shall be de-
termined by state law as it exists on January 1, 1999. 5
250 la § 6. In addition, if portions of the plaintiff's damage claim ultimately prove to be
uncollectible, and the plaintiff is an individual with a net worth of less than $200,000 (a so-
called "widow or orphan") and damages are greater than 10% of a plaintiff's net worth, a
solvent defendant is responsible for paying an additional 100% share of their liability, or an
additional 150% of this amount if they acted with "reckless disregard for the likelihood that its
acts would cause injury."
251 Idj § 4(d).
252 Id § 11. The legislation does not specify whether it would be appropriate to enforce a
damage limitation that was found to be unconscionable or a provision of adhesion, as is gener-
ally the case under section 4(d) of the Act.
253 Id. § 9. This limitation on damages does not apply where the defendant has engaged
in fraud.
254 Id. § 12. Some Democrats and the Administration sought to limit the applicability of
the new rule so that it would not apply where there was fraud in the inducement. Ultimately,
the legislation only excluded claims for intentional tort which arise independent of a contract.
255 L § 10. It is unclear if this would prevent courts from looking to common law inter-
pretations on these doctrines which develop after January 1, 1999. It is also unclear whether
this provision would apply to protect plaintiffs in the event a state changed their law to further
expand these doctrines, given that section 16 says the law is not to be construed to affect state
law affording greater protections to defendants in Y2K actions.
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The bill also makes a number of changes in order to prevent law-
suits from being brought against non-negligent defendants or those not in
direct privity with the harmed party. As a result, the Act freezes state
law concerning the standard of evidence needed to establish a defend-
ant's state of mind in a tort action as of January 1, 1999,256 and elimi-
nates the doctrine of so-called "bystander liability" by providing that
Y2K service providers are not liable to third parties who are not in priv-
ity with them unless the defendant actually knew, or recklessly disre-
garded a known and substantial risk, that a Y2K failure would occur.25 7
This latter change makes it more difficult, for example, for a customer of
a business that was certified to be Y2K compliant to sue the certifying
consultant. Finally, in this regard, the law provides that the fact that a
Y2K failure occurred in an environment within the control of the defend-
ant shall not be permitted to constitute a sole basis for the recovery of
damages.25 8
The Act further makes a number of procedural changes concerning
legal actions involving Y2K claims. These include a notice and "cooling
off' period preventing Y2K actions from proceeding to trial until the
defendant has first had a 90-day opportunity to fix the Y2K failure after
receiving written notice of the particular problem.259 The law also pro-
vides for heightened pleading requirements by requiring that plaintiffs
must provide specificity in the notice of damages sought in Y2K actions;
the factual basis for the damages claim; a statement of specific informa-
tion regarding the manifestations of the material defect and the facts sup-
porting such material defect; and a statement of facts showing a strong
inference that the defendant acted with a required state of mind.260
The law also overhauls the procedural rules applicable to Y2K class
actions. Subject to certain limited exceptions, the Act requires that Y2K
class actions be considered in federal, rather than state court.2 61 (This
provision is similar to broader legislation that would apply to all cases,
rather than just Y2K cases. 262) In addition, the bill only permits Y2K
256 Id. § 13(a).
257 Id. § 13(b).
258 Id § 13(c).
259 Id. § 7.
260 Id. § 8.
261 Id. § 15(c). The only exceptions to the mandated federal court jurisdiction for Y2K
class actions are where (1) a substantial majority of members of the plaintiff class are citizens
of a single state, the primary defendants are citizens of that state, and the claims asserted will
be governed primarily by the laws of that state; (2) the primary defendants are states or state
officials; (3) the plaintiff class does not seek an award of punitive damages and the amount in
controversy is less than $10 million; or (4) there are less than 100 members of the class. The
burden is on the plaintiff to establish that any of these four exceptions apply.
262 See, e.g., Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106 Cong.
(1999); Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, S. 353, 106' Cong. (1999). [ck nexis]
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actions which involve "material" product defects to proceed as class ac-
tions and requires class members to receive direct notice of the class
action (rather than mere notice by publication).263
There are several important overall limitations in scope in the Y2K
Act. First, the Act only applies to Y2K failures which occur on or before
January 1, 2003.264 This three-year time limitation was an important fac-
tor noted by President Clinton when he agreed to sign the legislation. 265
In addition, the legislation does not apply to any claims for personal in-
jury or wrongful death,266 and does not apply to securities actions.267
The law is also written to be "one-way preemptive,"' so that its provi-
sions do not supercede any state law having stricter liability
restrictions. 268
To a certain extent, the legislation signed into law reflected a com-
promise between' tort reform supporters and high technology concerns,
on the one hand, and tort reform opponents, on the other hand. This
explains why Democrats opted to offer their own substitute Y2K liability
legislation in the House and Senate, with some of these provisions being
incorporated into the final legislative product.269 This is also why many
of the more far reaching provisions of the original House and Senate bills
such as the "reasonable efforts" defense, "loser pays" provision, and lim-
itations on the overall liability of officers and directors were dropped
during the legislative process or in conference, 270 and why the Adminis-
tration insisted on the inclusion of numerous provisions that exempted
263 l § 15(a) & (b). The class notice is also required to include information concerning
the attorney's fee arrangements.
The Y2K Act includes several other minor procedural and technical provisions, including reg-
ulatory relief from penalties for Y2K related reporting or monitoring violations (§ 4 (g)); con-
sumer protection to ensures that homeowners cannot be foreclosed on due to a Y2K failure
(§ 4(h)); authorizing federal courts to appoint special masters to consider Y2K matters (§ 14);
applying Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (concerning the use of expert
testimony) to state courts (§ 17); and civil penalty waivers for first-time violations by a small
business of federally enforceable rules or requirements that are caused by a Y2K failure (§ 18);
264 Id. § 4(a).
265 Statement on Signing Y2K Act, 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 143 (July 20, 1999).
266 Id. § 4(c).
267 Id. § 4(i).
268 Id. § 16.
269 See House Democratic substitute offered by Rep. Conyers (D-M1), 145 Cong. Rec.
H3039-51(daily ed. May 12, 1999); Senate Democratic substitute offered by Sen. Kerry (D-
MA), 145 Cong. Rec. S657B76 (daily ed. June 12, 1999).
270 The House passed version of H.R. 775 included: (i) a "reasonable efforts" defense
providing that the fact that a defendant took reasonable measures to prevent the Y2K-related
failure was a complete defense to liability; (ii) a "loser pays" (or "English Rule") provision
requiring a litigant to be liable to pay the other side's attorneys' fees if they rejected a pre-trial
settlement offer and ultimately secured a less favorable verdict; and (iii) a provision capping
the personal liability of corporate directors and officers at the greater of $100,000 or their past
12-months' compensation. See H.R. 775, 1060' Cong, §§ 303, 507, & 305.
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so-called "bad actors" (i.e., intentional tortfeasors) from the bill's
protections.27 1
B. RECENTLY CONSIDERED TORT REFORM PROPOSALS
1. Senate Product Liability Proposal
Congress has been considering product liability legislation as early as
1979 when Rep. John Dingell (D-MI) introduced legislation which
would have federalized a number of areas of state liability law.272 Pro-
ponents of such reforms argue, inter alia, that state laws have led to ex-
cessive product liability damage awards, and the unpredictable and
"patchwork" nature of the state product liability system harms the com-
petitiveness of domestic manufacturing firms.273 After being unable to
bring a product liability reform bill to either the House or Senate floor
for a number of years, during the 104 th Congress the House and Senate
agreed to product liability legislation. That legislation would have, inter
alia, capped punitive damages for large and small businesses and nar-
rowed the standards for awarding such damages; eliminated joint and
several liability for non-economic damages; created a fifteen-year statute
of repose and a two-year statute of limitations; limited seller liability;
and limited liability for medical implant suppliers. President Clinton
subsequently vetoed the legislation.274
In the wake of President Clinton's veto, the White House entered
into negotiations with Senators Rockefeller (D-WVA) and Gorton (R-
271 See Y2K Act §§ 5(b), 6, 9, & 12 (limiting protections relating to punitive damages,
proportionate liability, duty to mitigate, and "economic loss" rule).
272 Among other things, the legislation would have created federal liability standards
along with a statute of limitations and repose and restricted the availability of punitive damage
awards. For a detailed legislative history of federal product liability reform efforts, see S. Rep.
No. 105-32, at 15-19 (1997); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Federal Product Liabil-
ity Reform in 1997: History and Public Policy Support Its Enactment Now, 64 Tenn. L. Rev.
595, 599 - 601 (1997); Sherman Joyce, Product Liability Law in the FederalArena, 19 Seattle
U. L. Rev. 421 (1996); Beth Rogers, Note, Legal Reform -at the Expense of Federalism?
House Bill 956, Common Sense Civil Justice Reform Act and Senate Bill 565, Product Liability
Reform Act, 21 U. Dayton L. Rev. 513, 517 - 519 (1996).
273 Product Liability Reform: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 9 (1997) (statement of Peter H. Hickok, Owner, Hickok Manufacturing Co., Inc.); Prod-
uct Liability and Legal Reform: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Rep. Hyde). See also Michael Rustad, Nationalizing Tort
Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 Rutgers L.
Rev. 673 (1996).
274 Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives the Com-
mon Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 780
(May 2, 1996). The President's Veto Statement opposed, inter alia, provisions eliminating
joint and several liability for non-economic damages and the limitations on punitive damages.
It also noted that the legislation inappropriately intruded on state authority. The House failed
to obtain the two-thirds vote necessary to override the President's veto on May 9, 1996 by a
vote of 258 to 163. See 142 Cong. Rec. H4764 (daily ed. May 9, 1996).
1999]
628 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:591
WA), culminating in a somewhat narrower form of product liability leg-
islation (the "Senate Product Liability Proposal"). 275 The Senate Product
Liability Proposal was brought directly to the Senate floor but its propo-
nents were unable to obtain cloture to cut off debate.276
The Senate Product Liability Proposal would cap the maximum
amount of punitive damages which may be awarded against "small busi-
nesses"277 and individuals with a net worth of less than one-half million
dollars at the lesser of two times "compensatory" damages or
$250,000.278 In addition, the proposal would narrow the grounds for the
award of punitive damages to those cases where there is a "conscious,
flagrant, indifference to the rights or safety of others" which can be es-
tablished by "clear and convincing evidence." 279 The foregoing restric-
tions do not apply in cases where death results. 280
The Senate Product Liability Proposal also provides for a national
statute of limitations and statute of repose.28 1 The statute of limitations
would be two years from the date a product liability harm is discovered
or should have been discovered "in the exercise of reasonable care. '282
The statute of repose is 18-years, but is limited to "durable goods," de-
fined as goods used in the workplace which are subject to a claim for
harm under the applicable workers compensation laws.283 The proposal
275 The Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105' Cong. (1998). The Senate
Proposal applies to a broad range of "product liability actions," defined as a civil action
brought on any theory for harm caused by a product. Id. § 101(16). It omits any provision
concerning joint and several liability, and narrows the scope of a number of other provisions
included in last Congress' product liability bill.
276 See 144 Cong. Rec. S7255 (daily ed. June 26, 1998).
277 A small business is defined as those with fewer than 25 full time employees and
annual revenues of $5 million or less. Id. § l10(b)(2)(A)(ii). The annual revenues and num-
bers of employees of a corporation include the annual revenues and employees of any parent
corporation, subsidiary, branch, division, or unit of that corporation. Id. § 1 10(b)(2)(B)(i) &
(ii).
278 Id. § 110(b)(1)(A) & (B). Compensatory damages include both economic and non-
economic damages. Id. § 101(6).
279 Id. § 110(a)(1). The Senate Proposal also provides for a bifurcated determination of
punitive damage awards. Under the proposal, any party may request that the court consider in
a separate proceeding, subsequent to the determination of compensatory damages, whether
punitive damages should be awarded. Id. § 110(a)(2)(A).
280 Id. § 111.
281 Id. § 106(a), Id. § 107(a).
282 Id. § 106(a). The proposal provides an exception to the statute of limitations so that
persons with a legal disability may file a product liability action up to two years after the date
in which the person ceases to have the disability. Id. § 106(b)(1). It also provides that if a
civil action is stayed or enjoined, the statute of limitations will be tolled until the end of the
stay or injunction. Id. § 106(b)(2). Finally, if a statute of limitations or statute of repose
provision shortens the period during which a product liability action could be otherwise
brought, the claimant may bring the product liability action within one year after the date of
enactment of the legislation. Id. § 108.
283 Id. § 107(a). The proposal provides exceptions to the statute of repose for (1) motor
vehicles, vessels, aircraft or trains used primarily to transport passengers for hire, (2) actions
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also preempts state tort law in cases where the claimant has used alcohol
or drugs, or where the product has been misused or altered. It is a com-
plete defense to liability where claimant's drug or alcohol use was more
than 50% responsible for the harm.284 With regard to product misuse or
alteration, the Senate Proposal provides that claimant's damages shall be
reduced by the portion of harm attributable to misuse (whether by the
claimant or otherwise). 285 This applies where the defendant can prove
that a percentage of the claimant's harm was proximately caused by use
or alteration of a product in violation of or contrary to an express warn-
ing or involved a risk of harm which was known or should have been
known by a reasonable person who uses the product. 286 Damages to a
claimant as a result of workplace injuries would be exempt from this
comparative negligence standard.287
The Senate Proposal also offers relief to product sellers, lessors, and
renters by specifying that they may only be subject to a product liability
suit where they: (1) failed to exercise reasonable care; (2) violated an
express warranty; or (3) engaged in intentional wrongdoing.288 This has
the effect of eliminating seller liability under theories of strict liability,
failure to warn, or breach of an implied warranty.
The Senate Proposal includes provisions designed to encourage al-
ternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and settlement negotiations. It
grants the parties the option of using any applicable voluntary, non-bind-
ing ADR within specified time periods after a product liability suit is
brought.289
The proposal exempts several categories of product liability actions
from its provisions entirely. 290 These include actions involving "com-
mercial loss" by other businesses; negligent gun sales; tobacco products;
breast implants, defective tissues, organs and blood; and electricity,
water and natural gas.29 1 The proposal also includes a workers' compen-
sation subrogation provision which would alter state law to provide if the
based on an express warranty in writing for longer than eighteen years, and (3) the limitation
period established by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994. Id. § 107(c).
284 Ld. § 104(a).
285 Id. § 105(a).
286 Id. § 105(a)(1)(A) & (B).
287 Id. § 105(b).
288 Id. § 103(a)(1). Under the proposal, a product seller will not be considered to have
failed to exercise reasonable care if there was no reasonable opportunity to inspect the product,
or if the inspection would not have revealed the aspect of the product that allegedly caused the
claimant's harm. Id. § 103(a)(2).
289 Id. § 109(a) & (b). Under the proposal, the claimant or defendant may offer to an
adverse party to proceed under ADR within 60 days of the service of the initial complaint or
the expiration of the period for a responsive pleading, and an offeree must file a written notice
of acceptance or rejection within 20 days of receipt of the offer.
290 Id. §§ 101(15)(B) & 102(a)(2).
291 Id.
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trier of fact finds by clear and convincing evidence that fault of the em-
ployer was a substantial factor in causing a workplace injury, the em-
ployer would have to bear the costs of the worker.292
2. House Medical Malpractice Proposal
Over the last two Congresses, the House has passed medical malpractice
reform legislation four separate times,293 with the Senate failing to con-
cur on each occasion. Supporters of these reforms claim that excessive
and frivolous medical malpractice claims unduly increase the costs of
health care, both directly (through increased insurance premiums) and
indirectly (through the costs of so-called "defensive medicine").294
The most recent proposal (the "House Medical Malpractice Propo-
sal") 295 considered in the 105'" Congress would have preempted state law
concerning "health care liability actions" 296 in a number of regards. It
would limit "non-economic" damages297 by capping their award at
292 Title II of the Senate Product Liability Proposal also included relief for suppliers of
raw materials and component parts for medical implants, a form of which was subsequently
signed into law. See supra section IV.A.5.
The Senate Proposal includes a general preemption provision, indicating that except as
otherwise provided, the legislation is to preempt certain state law on a "two-way" basis. As
such, the bill could operate to preempt some laws that are more favorable to defendants than
the draft provides. For example, under the Senate Proposal, actions brought in states which do
not have a statute of limitations running from the time harm is discovered would be subject to
a lengthier statute of limitations period than under their currently applicable law. See supra
note 283 (for example, Virginia bars claims filed a specified number of years after a person
has been injured, regardless of whether the person actually knew of the injury. See VA Code
Ann. §§ 8.01- 243 (Michie 1997)). The preemption provisions are not drafted to provide
causes of action where they do not otherwise exist. For example, the punitive damages caps
would only apply in states which otherwise allow for punitive damages, rather than allowing
for punitive damage actions in all states. Id. § 110(a)(1).
293 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, H.R. 2015, 105th Cong. (1997); Health Care Cov-
erage Availability and Affordability Act, H.R. 3160, 104th Cong. (1996); Balanced Budget
Act of 1995, H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. (1995); Common Sense Product Liability and Legal
Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995).
294 See, e.g., Rep. Bill Thomas, Rest of Country Deserves Medical Liability Refonns
State of Califomia Passed for itself Two Decades Ago, Roll Call, Nov. 13, 1995 (Health Care
Policy Briefing), at 9.
295 See supra note 294.
296 A health care liability action is defined as a civil action brought in a state or federal
court against a health care provider, an entity which is obligated to provide or pay for health
benefits under any health plan (including any person or entity acting under a contract or ar-
rangement to provide or administer a health benefit), or the manufacturer, distributor, supplier,
marketer, promoter, or seller of a medical product in which the claimant alleges a health care
liability claim. Id. § 4802(10).
297 Id. § 4812(a)(1). Non-economic damages are defined as damages paid to an individ-
ual for pain and suffering, inconvenience, emotional distress, mental anguish, loss of society
and companionship, injury to reputation, humiliation, and other subjective, nonpecuniary
losses. Id. § 4802(14).
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$250,000298 as well as eliminating claimants' rights to hold defendants
jointly and severally liable for such non-economic damages.299 The pro-
posal also prohibits bringing any health care liability action more than
two years after an injury and the cause of the injury is discovered, or, in
the exercise of reasonable care, should have been discovered. 3°°
The House Medical Malpractice proposal would also limit punitive
damage awards by creating a maximum cap of the greater of $250,000 or
three times "economic damages," 301 and narrow the grounds for award-
ing punitive damages to cases where it can be established by clear and
convincing evidence that the injury was suffered by conduct manifesting
a "conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights and safety of others.' '3°2
Other proposed changes would allow for the periodic payment of
damages and modifications to the collateral source rule.30 3 Under the
House Medical Malpractice Proposal, a defendant is permitted to pay any
health care liability damage award greater than $50,000 in periodic in-
stallments as determined by the court.304 The proposal would alter the
traditional collateral source rule 30 5 by allowing defendants to introduce
298 Id. Although there is no provision dealing with preemption issues, these provisions are
written so they would not preempt any state law with higher liability caps.
299 Id. § 4812(a)(2).
300 Id. § 4811(a). The proposal provides an exception so that persons with a legal disabil-
ity may file an action up to two years after the date on which they cease to have the legal
disability. I&a § 4811(b). It also provides a transitional provision so that if a provision under
the statute of limitations shortens the period during which a health care liability action would
be brought, the claimant may bring an action up to two years after the date of enactment of this
Act. Id. § 4811(c).
301 Id. § 4812(b)(2). Economic loss is defined in the proposal as any pecuniary loss re-
sulting from harm (including the loss of earnings or other benefits related to employment,
medical expense loss, replacement services loss, loss due to death, burial costs, and loss of
business or employment opportunities), to the extent recovery for such loss is allowed under
applicable state or federal law. Id. § 4802(8).
302 Id § 4812(b)(1). The proposal also allows for bifurcated proceedings for the consid-
eration of punitive damage claims and ban punitive damage awards in the case of drugs or
other devices that have been approved by the FDA or any other drug generally recognized as
safe and effective pursuant to FDA-established conditions. Id §§ 4812(c)(2), (d)(1). The ban
on punitive damages would not apply in cases where the defendant intentionally and wrong-
fully withheld from or misrepresented information to the Food and Drug Administration that is
material and relevant to the harm suffered by the claimant. Id. § 4812(d)(1)(B).
303 In addition, the House Medical Malpractice Proposal requires that any ADR system
used to resolve health care liability actions or claims must include provisions specified in the
bill regarding statute of limitations, non-economic damages, joint and several liability, punitive
damages, the collateral source rule, and periodic payments of damage awards. Id. § 4813.
304 Id § 4812(E). The judgment of the court awarding periodic payments may not be
reopened to contest, amend, or modify the schedule or amount of the payments, absent any
fraud.
305 Under the collateral source rule, a victim is able to obtain compensation for the full
amount of damages incurred, and his or her health insurance provider is able to seek subroga-
tion in respect of its own payments to the victim. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 920(A)
(1979).
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evidence of any collateral payments received by claimants and eliminat-
ing rights to subrogation by third parties. 30 6
3. Tobacco Settlement
Over the course of the 105' Congress the House and Senate also consid-
ered enacting a variation of the global tobacco settlement (the "Tobacco
Settlement") 307 which includes a number of provisions limiting claim-
ants' ability to bring tobacco related lawsuits under state tort law. Propo-
nents asserted that absent these litigation reforms there would be no
incentive for the tobacco companies to agree to make the payments and
accept the other restrictions set forth in the settlement.308
In many respects, the litigation restrictions contained in the Tobacco
Settlement go well beyond the pending product liability and medical
malpractice reform proposals. For example, instead of capping or nar-
rowing the standards for the award of punitive damages, the Tobacco
Settlement provides total immunity from punitive damages for any past
misconduct by tobacco companies. 30 9 Moreover, in addition to com-
pletely eliminating liability by sellers or agents of the tobacco indus-
try,310 the agreement legislatively preempts any pending or future
Attorney General actions and any "addiction/dependence" claims.3 11
306 Id. § 4812(F). If the defendant introduces evidence of collateral source payments, the
claimant may introduce evidence of the insurance amount that is paid or likely to be paid to
secure the collateral source payment. ld. § 4812(F)(1). The provider of the collateral source
payment cannot recover any amount against the claimant or receive a lien or credit against the
claimant's recovery, or be subrogated the right of the claimant, whether the action is settled or
tried. lId § 4812(F)(2).
307 Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement, 12.3 TPLR 3.203 (June 20, 1997). Legislation
was introduced in the 105' Congress which would convert the provisions of the Proposed
Resolution into legislative language. See Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1414, 105th
Cong. (1997). Eventually, the Senate considered a version of the legislation which excluded
many of the litigation descriptions described herein, but the Senate failed to invoke cloture to
cut off debate on the legislation. See Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105' Cong.
(1997); 144 Cong. Rec. S6743 (daily ed. June 17, 1998).
308 The Civil Liability Portions of the Proposed Tobacco Settlement: Hearing Before the
House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105' Cong. (1998) (written statement of Meyer Koplow at 3-
4).
309 Id. at 3.221, Title VIII.B.1. The settlement deems a one-time $60 billion payment
made by the tobacco industry to public health funds to constitute resolution of past punitive
damage claims. Proponents also argue that given the poor record of private tobacco plaintiffs
to date, these litigation "concessions" will have little practical impact. See 12.3 TPLR at
3.203-3.205 ("none of [the past civil actions] has to date resulted in the collection of any
monies to compensate smokers or third-party payors").
310 The Tobacco Settlement also eliminates claims against sellers entirely (Title VIII.B.5),
whereas the Senate Product Liability Proposal would limit seller liability to claims involving
failure to exercise reasonable care, violation of an express warranty, and intentional wrongdo-
ing. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
311 12.3 TPLR at 3.221, Title VIII.A.
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The Tobacco Settlement provides for an annual cap on tobacco lia-
bility equal to 33% of the annual "Industry Base Payment" (an agreed
upon amount equal to $6 billion in the first year, increasing to $15 billion
in the ninth year and thereafter),312 resulting in a maximum liability of
$5 billion per year.313 This amount is to be paid each year, regardless of
whether the annual amount of judgments and settlements aggregate to the
maximum figure (any shortfall is subject to allocation by a Presidential
Commission). 3 14 In addition, because the Tobacco Settlement solely
provides for the industry to receive an 80% credit against this maximum
amount for any liability judgments or settlements entered into (a so-
called 20% "litigation co-payment penalty"), the industry is also subject
to a secondary liability of up to an additional $1 billion per year.315 To
the extent judgments and settlements exceed the maximum statutory
amount in any given year, the liability carries over to the following
year.316 In addition, individual claimants may only recover $1 million in
a given year, even if awarded more, unless there are funds left over from
the Industry Base Payment.317 In order to help ameliorate any perceived
unfairness between the liability obligations of the participating compa-
nies and other tobacco companies, the Tobacco Settlement requires non-
participating companies to place into an escrow fund 150% of what
would otherwise have been their share of the annual payment pending
their payment of any liability claims. Under the settlement "[tihese es-
crowed funds would be earmarked for potential liability payments, and
the manufacturer would reclaim them with interest 35 years later to the
extent they had not been paid out in liability."318 The Tobacco Settle-
ment provides that tobacco manufacturers will pay their own legal de-
312 ld. at 3.218, Title VI.B.3. The Industry Base Payment is to be increased to account for
inflation at a rate of the greater of 3% or the consumer price index, and is to be decreased to
account for any cumulative decline in unit cigarette volume (from the 1996 base). Each partic-
ipating company's share of the Industry Base Payment is to be based on their respective cur-
rent market shares.
313 Under the settlement proposal, obligations for annual payments apply only to entities
selling into the domestic market. Id. Title VI.B.6
314 Id. at 3.222, Title VIII.B.10. Under the settlement, "[tihe Commission will be entitled
to consider, among public health, governmental entities, and other uses of the funds, applica-
tions for compensation from persons, including non-subrogation claims of third party payors,
not otherwise entitled to compensation under the Act."
315 Id. at 3.221, Title VIII.B.9. The litigation co-payment provision was apparently in-
cluded to provide an incentive for the tobacco industry to fully defend themselves in liability
actions.
316 Id. Title VIII.B.9.
317 Id. Any excess rolls forward without interest to be paid at a rate of $1 million per
year, until the first year that the annual aggregate cap is not exceeded, at which time the
remainder is to be paid in full. The settlement treats any eligible third party payer actions not
based on subrogation (i.e., those filed before June 9, 1997) as having been brought by a single
plaintiff and subject to the $1 million rollover requirement.
318 Id. at 3.215, Title Ill.
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fense fees, but is silent on the issue of the payment of plaintiff's fees for
legal services performed on behalf of the State Attorneys General.319
The Tobacco Settlement eliminates joint liability between partici-
pating and non-participating tobacco companies, 320 requiring instead that
tobacco companies agree to share responsibility with respect to suits
brought against each other.321 The Tobacco Settlement also bans third
party payers from bringing suits (other than non-aggregated subrogation
suits322) claiming they have paid a portion of damages which should
have been paid by the tobacco companies. 32
The Tobacco Settlement additionally imposes a number of proce-
dural and evidentiary requirements with respect to tobacco liability ac-
tions. Significantly, it bars current and future class actions in federal and
state courts as well as all other devices for the consolidation and aggrega-
tion of claims without the tobacco companies' consent. 324 The proposal
also provides for a panel of three federal judges to review all claims of
privilege or trade secrets asserted at the state or federal level with respect
to tobacco industry documents.325 The Tobacco Settlement further spec-
ifies that the existence of "reduced risk tobacco products" 326 are neither
admissible nor discoverable in civil liability actions.327
319 1d Title VII.B.1 1. Although not set forth in the settlement, several of the parties have
separately agreed that the tobacco industry will pay up to $500 million per year to attorneys
representing the states with the specific amounts to be determined by a panel of three arbitra-
tors. See Suein Z. Hwang & Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Concerns Set Pact on Legal Fees, Wall
St. J., Dec. 2, 1997, at A2.
320 12.3 TPLR at 3.221, Title VIII.B.4.
321 Id.
322 A subrogation suit would include a health insurer seeking to recoup any medical bene-
fit payments it made to a claimant.
323 12.3 TPLR at 3.221, Title VIII.B.5.b. This means, for example, that asbestos defend-
ants and union health and welfare funds which have paid workers for cancer and other disease
claims would be unable to bring suit seeking reimbursement from tobacco companies for their
portion of smoking related diseases.
324 ld. Title VIII.B.2. The settlement provides for "individual trials only," specifically
barring "class actions, joinder, aggregations, consolidations, extrapolations or other devices to
resolve cases other than on the basis of individual trials, without defendant's consent." This
provision is subject to enforcement by removal to federal court by the defendant "upon receipt
or application to, or order of, state court providing for trial or other procedure in violation of
the [individual trial] provision." I.
325 1d at 3.232, Appendix VIII.3. The three judge panel is to be appointed by the Judicial
Conference and is to decide the disputes in accordance with the ABI/ALI Model Rules and
principles of federal law concerning privilege and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act concerning
trade secrecy. The panel's costs are to be borne by the tobacco industry, which is also required
to pay their opponents' costs and attorneys' fees if the tobacco company did not have a good
faith factual and legal basis for the assertion of the privilege.
326 Id. at 3.221, Title VIII(B)(7). An example of a reduced risk tobacco product would be
a less carcinogenic cigarette.
327 1d&
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT FEDERAL TORT
REFORMS
328
This Part analyzes the range of potential constitutional challenges
which may be brought against federal tort reforms. As a threshold matter,
there is a question whether these proposals constitute a valid exercise of
Congress' commerce authority, and if not, whether they may be justified
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, there are
separate questions whether the reforms violate (1) Fifth Amendment due
process and equal protection principles; (2) Seventh Amendment jury
trial requirements; and (3) Tenth Amendment federalism principles.
1. Constitutional Authority
a. Commerce Clause 329
Although The Employers' Liability Cases330 placed limitations on
Congress' ability to alter state tort law with respect to intrastate con-
duct,331 the Court had subsequently deferred to Congress concerning
commerce authority332 matters for nearly sixty years (from 1937 to
1995). 3 33 In the wake of Lopez v. United States334 striking down the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,335 however, there is concern that
under appropriate circumstances federal tort reforms may again be inval-
328 For a general discussion of the constitutionality of various tort reform laws and
proposals, see Henry Cohen, The Constitutionality of Federal Tort Reform Legislation, CRS
Report for Congress (Oct. 24, 1997); Kathryn L. Vezina, Note, Constitutional Challenges to
Caps on Tort Damages: Is Tort Reform the Dragon Slayer or is it the Dragon?, 42 ME. L.
REV. 218 (1990); Susan C. Schmidt & Andrew B. Derman, The Constitutionality of Federal
Products Liability/Toxic Tort Legislation, 6 J. PROD. LIAB. 171 (1983); Martin H. Redish,
Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 TEX L. REV759 (1977).
329 For a general analysis of Commerce Clause issues in the context of federal tort
reforms, see Jerry J. Phillips, Hoisted by One's Own Petard: When a Conservative Commerce
Clause Interpretation Meets Conservative Tort Reform, 64 TENN L. REV 647 (1997).
330 207 U.S. 463 (1907).
331 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
332 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, "Congress shall have
Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States ... 
U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
333 The Court went from NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), to
Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), without striking down a single federal law on
Commerce Clause grounds.
334 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
335 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994) (The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 made it a
federal criminal offense to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone).
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idated on these grounds. 336 Both the Volunteer Protection Act and the
Food Donation Act may present such cases. 337
In Lopez, the Court identified three categories of activity Congress
may regulate under its commerce power: the "use of the channels of in-
terstate commerce," the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and
activity "that substantially affects interstate commerce. '338 The Court
found that the school gun ban at issue clearly did not implicate either of
the first two categories, and, after reviewing a series of factors, found its
affect on interstate commerce was too removed to comply with the third
category. 339
If challenged on Commerce Clause grounds, defenders of the Vol-
unteer Protection Act and the Food Donation Act will no doubt attempt
to distinguish Lopez by asserting that although volunteerism and food
donation have significant local and non-commercial aspects, in the ag-
gregate such activities can substantially affect interstate commerce be-
cause: they serve valuable community functions, are linked with federal
expenditures and involve the use of federal tax exemptions, are subject to
replacement by private comimercial services, and implicate the interstate
insurance market. Further, defenders of the Volunteer Protection Act
336 See, e.g., T.R. Goldman, Lopez Gives Tort Reform a New Weapon, Legal Times, May
8, 1995, at 2 (quoting Harvard Law School Professor Lawrence Tribe for the proposition that
"Lopez is a reminder that the commerce clause is not a blank check. As such, it will operate to
at least raise significant questions about some of the elements of proposed tort reforms pending
in Congress").
337 Commerce Clause concerns may also be raised in the context of other tort reforms.
For conflicting views on the likely constitutionality of federal product liability and medical
malpractice legislation, see Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 273 at 606-7 ("[i]n contrast to
[the Gun- Free School Zones Act struck down in Lopez], product liability is without question a
matter of interstate commerce"); Phillips, supra note 330 at 663 ("[tlhe four factors of Lopez-
legislative findings, jurisdictional fact, localness, and nature of the activity-all point to vary-
ing degrees to the conclusion that [product liability legislation] may well be unconstitutional if
enacted under the authority of the Commerce Clause"); Rogers, supra note 273 at 540 ("Be-
cause Congress' claim to Commerce Clause authority is based on arbitrary conclusions [prod-
uct liability legislation] is constitutionally questionable"); Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and
Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 429, 441
(1996) ("the increasingly commercial nature of medical practice would almost certainly qual-
ify [it] for federal regulation under the commerce power"); Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the
Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 922 ("the federal interest
in malpractice is doubtful: malpractice seems strikingly lacking in either [interstate] spill-over
effects or a clear uniformity need").
338 514 U.S. at 558-559.
339 Id. at 559-568. If challenged, the laws' defenders should be able to assert that the
mere fact that the regulated activity involves "non-profit' as opposed to "for-profit" activity is
not necessarily dispositive of the Commerce Clause issue. For example, last term in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, -U.S.__; 117 S.Ct. 1590, 1602 (1997), the
Supreme Court found that the so-called "dormant Commerce Clause" was implicated by a
Maine law concerning non-profits, observing "there is no reason why an enterprise's nonprofit
character should exclude it from the coverage of either the affirmative or the negative aspect of
the [Commerce] Clause .. "
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will be able to argue that unlike the School-Gun ban struck down in
Lopez, the Volunteer Protection Act contains detailed legislative findings
to this effect 340 and is supported by abundant legislative history34' reiter-
ating its Commerce Clause rationale. Indeed, in his dissent in Lopez,
Justice Souter suggested that if Congress had included explicit legislative
finding that guns in schools have a substantial affect on interstate com-
merce, "the result in this case might well have been different. 342
Defenders of these liability laws may also point to the fact that Lo-
pez is a highly fact specific decision, and the Court has subsequently
upheld other laws having a seemingly precarious nexus to interstate com-
merce. Recently, for example, the Supreme Court failed to grant certio-
rari in two companion cases, United States v. Ramey343 and United
States v. Moore,344 where the Fourth Circuit found the federal arson stat-
ute34 5 to constitute an appropriate exercise of Congress' commerce
power. In those cases, the principal linkage to interstate commerce was a
burned trailer's usage of electricity derived from an interstate power
grid.346
At the same time, challengers of the Volunteer Protection Act and
Food Donation Act's constitutionality will be able to argue that many of
the factors used to strike down Lopez are also present in these laws. For
example, the majority opinion placed great emphasis on the gun ban not
340 42 U.S.C.A. § 14501(a)(7) (West Supp. m 1997).
341 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-101, pt. 1, at 6-7 (1997) ("Volunteerism is a national
activity and the decline in volunteerism is a national concern. And in many cases, volunteer
activities cross state lines .... The patchwork quality of state volunteer liability laws also has
a negative effect on the cost of insurance. Because of the small size of the market for volun-
teer liability insurance, insurers do not differentiate among the states."); 143 Cong. Rec. S3879
(daily ed. May 1, 1997) (statement of Sen. McConnell) ("If the Kentucky Red Cross volunteer
wants to cross over into Tennessee or Ohio or llinois or Indiana or West Virginia or Virginia
and help his neighbor recover from a flood, then he should not have to call his lawyer to check
on his liability potential in a surrounding state. We must have a uniform minimum standard.").
342 514 U.S. at 612.
343 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103 (1995).
344 25 F.3d 1042 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1102 (1995). See also Leslie Salt
Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Cargill, Inc. v. United States,
516 U.S. 955 (1995) (existence of migratory birds on property created sufficient nexus with
interstate commerce to permit regulation of lands by Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean
Water Act).
345 18 U.S.C. § 844(1) (1994).
346 See Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607; United States v. Moore, No. 93-5273, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14314, at *10-11 (4th Cir. Apr. 13, 1994). See also Ackerman, supra note 338 at 439
(arguing Lopez is undercut by numerous circuit court decisions upholding the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act on Commerce Clause grounds).
But see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999)(en banc), cert. granted, sub. nom., U.S. v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 11 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999)
(No. 99-5, 99-29) (striking down the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and
Section5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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constituting an "essential part of larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activities were regulated. ' 347 The linkage between non-commercial vol-
unteer and food donation activities and interstate commerce is also ar-
guably somewhat attenuated. As the Court observed in Lopez, "[t]o
uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile infer-
ence upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
the sort retained by the states [and] ... there never will be a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local. '348
Another factor mitigating against the constitutionality of both the
Volunteer Protection Act and the Food Donation Act is their lack of an
interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement. According to the Court
in Lopez, one of the problems with the school gun ban was that it con-
tained "no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a
discrete set of firearms possessions that additionally have an explicit con-
nection with or effect on interstate commerce." 349 Notably, the Ramey
and Moore decisions350 involved a statute which contained such an ex-
press jurisdictional element.351 Further, when Congress acted in 1996 to
remedy the constitutional infirmity in the school gun ban invalidated by
Lopez, it limited the law to firearms that have "moved in or that other-
wise [affect] interstate or foreign commerce." 352 This is also the lesson
of The Employers' Liability Cases353 and The Second Employers' Liabil-
ity Cases354-only after the employers' liability law was changed to
clearly limit its application to injuries involving persons employed in in-
terstate commerce was the statute found to pass constitutional
scrutiny.355
347 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
348 Id. at 567-68.
349 Id. at 562.
350 Supra notes 345 & 346.
351 18 U.S.C. § 844(1) (1994) (applying federal criminal law to crimes against property
"used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce").
352 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994) (amended 1996) (West Supp. 1998).
353 207 U.S. 463 (1907).
354 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
355 This was one of the principal constitutional concerns with the Volunteer Protection
Act highlighted by the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel in their comments on the
legislation. They wrote that even with an express congressional finding creating a nexus be-
tween volunteer liability and the Federal Government, "we are concerned that the bill might
invite challenge as to Congress' source of authority because it is not directly tied to Congress'
spending power.., and not limited to volunteer organizations that engage in interstate com-
merce or liability that arises by reason of volunteer services affecting interstate commerce."
(Office of Legal Counsel Comments on S. 543, Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 (on file with
authors) (citations omitted)).
THE THnUD WAVE OF FEDERAL TORT REFORM
Finally, the Court in Lopez observed there were certain traditional
areas of state law, such as criminal law and education, which should be
off limits to federal intervention.3 56 The concurrence by Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor also reasoned that the Federal Government should
avoid involving itself in areas which fall within the "traditional concern
of the states," noting that over 40 states had adopted laws outlawing the
possession of firearms on or near school grounds. 357 These same con-
cerns could also lie with the Volunteer Protection Act and Food Dona-
tion Act, particularly given that all 50 states have adopted some form of
special liability protection for volunteers in general and good samaritan
food donation activities in particular.358 Accordingly, if Lopez represents
a substantial turning point in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisdiction,
rather than a mere symbolic warning, it is likely to prove difficult to
uphold laws which involve activity which is both intrastate and non-com-
mercial in nature.359
b. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
While the Commerce Clause is the most obvious source of authority to
justify federal tort legislation, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment also grants Congress the power to legislatively enforce the constitu-
tional requirement of due process.360 Several recent tort reform
proposals have made reference to this authority. For example, the prod-
uct liability legislation reported by the Senate Commerce Committee in
1997 includes a finding that "it is the constitutional role of the national
government to... protect due process rights."'361 Similarly, the Volun-
teer Protection Act of 1997 contains an express finding that "liability
reform is an appropriate use of the powers contained in... the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution."362
356 514 U.S. at 641.
357 Id. at 651-52.
358 See Nonprofit Risk Management Center, State Liability Laws for Charitable Organi-
zations and Volunteers (1996); La Vonne Grabiak, State Laws Limiting Liability of Food Do-
nors, CRS Memorandum for Congress (March 16, 1987). But see The Second Employers'
Liability Cases, supra note 53 (disregarding that state workplace liability laws "were far from
uniform" in upholding the constitutionality of the 1908 Act).
359 514 U.S. 549.
360 Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress "the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of the [Fourteenth Amendment]." U.S. Const. amend
xiV, § 5.
361 S. 648, § 2 (a)(9) (1997). The Commerce Committee Report also concludes that "Fed-
eral legislation to reform punitive damages falls squarely within the 'broad power' of Congress
to 'carry out' both the letter and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment." S. Rep. No. 105-32, at
45 (1997).
362 42 U.S.C.A. § 14501(a)(7)(D)(ii) (West Supp. 11 1997). The House Judiciary Com-
mittee Report included a "Constitutional Authority Statement' stating that the legislation was
authorized under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. H.R. Rep. No.
105-101, pt. 1, at 13 (1997).
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The Supreme Court has never considered whether Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment provides the necessary authority to support
federal tort reforms, although it has validated the use of this authority in
other contexts, most notably voting rights laws.3 63 Significantly, in City
of Boerne v. Flores,364 in invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA),365 the Court restated its understanding of the scope
of legislative authority generally available under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Boerne Court held that Congress' power
under Section Five extends only to " 'enforc[ing]' the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . rather than decree[ing] the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states. '366
Boerne emphasized the importance of developing a legislative rec-
ord of constitutional infirmities supporting the need for legislation under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized:
While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial meas-
ures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends
achieved. The appropriateness of the remedial measures must be consid-
ered in light of the evil presented .... In contrast to the record which
confronted Congress and the judiciary in the voting rights cases, RFRA's
legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of generally appli-
cable laws passed because of religious bigotry.367
Given these parameters, it would seem that the most plausible case
for the use of congressional authority under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment pertains to limitations on punitive damages. Advo-
cates of using this authority will be able to point to two recent Supreme
Court precedents striking down specific punitive damage awards based
on due process grounds. In 1996, in BMW of North America v. Gore,368
the Court found that a judgment of $2 million in punitive damages
awarded to a consumer fraud plaintiff sustaining actual damages of only
$4,000 was so "grossly excessive" 369 as to violate due process. Two
363 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (provisions in the
Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (ban on literacy tests
that had prevented certain persons schooled in Puerto Rico from voting); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970) (5-year nationwide ban on literacy tests); City of Rome v United States,
446 U.S. 156 (1980) (extension of Voting Rights Act's requirement that certain jurisdictions
pre-clear changes in voting procedures). These laws implicated Congress' due process power
under the Fourteenth Amendment and voting rights powers under the Fifteenth Amendment.
364 521 U.S. __; 117 S.Ct. 2157; 138 L.Ed. 624; 65 U.S.L.W. 4612 (U.S. June 25, 1997).
365 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994) (prohibiting federal, state, and local govern-
ments from substantially burdening the exercise of religion).
366 65 U.S.L.W at 4615, quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326
(1966).
367 65 U.S.L.W. at 4618 (citations omitted).
368 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809, 64 U.S.L.W. 4335 (1996).
369 64 U.S.L.W. at 4339.
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years earlier, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,370 the Court invalidated a
punitive damage award of $5 million, finding that an Oregon law limit-
ing the scope of judicial review of punitive damage awards371 violated
procedural due process.
In Gore the Court identified three "guideposts" for determining
whether a punitive damage award is "grossly excessive": degree of repre-
hensibility, ratio between punitive award and plaintiff's actual harm, and
legislative sanctions provided for possible misconduct.372 The second of
these guideposts, ratio between punitive damages award and actual harm,
is arguably directly evocative of provisions in the Senate Product Liabil-
ity Proposal which cap the maximum punitive damage award payable by
"small businesses" at the lesser of $250,000 or two times compensatory
damages.373 In Gore, the Court made much of the fact that "It]he $2
million in punitive damages awarded to Dr. Gore by the Alabama
Supreme Court is 500 times the amount of actual harm determined by the
jury. '374 Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has previously
found other challenged punitive damage awards not to violate due pro-
cess in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip375 and TXO Produc-
tion Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,376 the Gore Court read these
decisions as "endors[ing] the proposition that a comparison between the
compensatory award and punitive award is significant" in assessing
whether the award violated due process. 377
370 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
371 An amendment to the Oregon Constitution prohibits judicial review of punitive dam-
age amounts "unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the ver-
dict." See 512 U.S. at 418.
372 64 U.S.L.W. at 4339.
373 Supra note 279. A number of tort reform proposals seek to limit punitive damage
awards. See Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
104-481 (1996) (capping punitive damages generally at greater of two times compensatory
damages or $250,000, subject to judicial authority to increase up to jury award based on speci-
fied extenuating circumstances, with cap on small businesses and certain individuals set at
lesser of these two amounts); House Medical Malpractice Proposal, supra note 302 (capping
punitive damages at the greater of $250,000 or three times economic damages); the Tobacco
Settlement, supra note 310, would eliminate punitive damage liability completely for past
misconduct by the tobacco industry.
374 64 U.S.L.W. at 4342.
375 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (punitive damage award of more than $1 million where insurance
company found responsible for fraud of employee found not to violate Fourteenth Amendment
due process). In Haslip, the Court also considered in dicta the constitutionality of state impo-
sition of a higher standard of proof to establish punitive damages, writing, "[tibere is much to
be said in favor of a State's requiring ... a standard of 'clear and convincing evidence' or,
even, 'beyond a reasonable doubt'... . We are not persuaded, however, that the Due Process
Clause requires that much." Id. at 23 n.ll.
376 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (punitive damage award of $10 million stemming from slander of
title case found not to violate Fourteenth Amendment due process).
377 64 U.S.L.W. at 4341.
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Defenders of Congress' use of authority under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to limit punitive damages also find support in the
Court's decision in Honda.378 The Court, in considering whether Ore-
gon's existing procedures for awarding punitive damages were fair, ob-
served in dicta, "the clear and convincing standard of proof [required
under Oregon law] is an important check against the unwarranted impo-
sition of punitive damages. ' 379 This would seem to favorably relate to
the provisions in the various product liability reforms seeking to import
this evidentiary requirement into federal law.380
At the same time, while cases such as Gore and Honda have opened
the door for Congress to use the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment
authority to limit punitive damages, a strong argument can be made that
the proposed caps on punitive damages in the pending tort reform pro-
posals do not fall within the "guideposts" laid down by the Court.381
Although the Court has considered the punitive to compensatory damage
ratios in its recent decisions, it has consistently rejected the notion of a
straightforward arithmetic cut-off or cap. In Gore, the Majority declared:
[W]e have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional
line [of due process] is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even
one that compares actual and punitive damages to the punitive award.
Indeed low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a
higher ratio than high compensatory damage awards, if for example, a
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of eco-
nomic damages. A higher ratio may also bejustified in cases in which
the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of the non-economic
harm might have been difficult to determine. 382
Similarly, the Courts in Haslip and TXO have rejected the formulaic
use of punitive damage ratios in assessing due process. 383 Persons chal-
lenging congressional authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment in this regard will be able to note the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages permitted in those cases-4 to 1 in Haslip, and
more than 500 to one in TXO are both well in excess of the ratio permit-
378 512 U.S. 415.
379 512 U.S. at 433 (although this aspect of Oregon law was determined in and of itself
not sufficient to protect against arbitrary awards).
380 See Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act, supra note 191; Volunteer
Protection Act, supra note 204; Amtrak Act, supra note 223; Senate Product Liability Propo-
sal, supra note 276; House Medical Malpractice Proposal, supra note 294.
381 In his dissent to Gore, Justice Scalia wrote that the Majority's "' guideposts' mark a
road to nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all." 64 U.S.L.W. at 4348.
382 Id at 4342.
383 In Haslip, the Court wrote "[wie need not, and indeed we cannot draw a mathematical
bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that
would fit every case." 499 U.S. at 18. This language was affirmatively quoted in TXO. 509
U.S. at 458.
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ted under the Senate Product Liability Proposal. 384 Moreover, since the
Senate Product Liability Proposal provides for a punitive damages cap at
the lesser of $250,000 or two times compensatory damages, it will not
always be tied into the amount of compensatory damages.385 To the ex-
tent that various punitive damage limitations go beyond the Court's pro-
nouncements concerning due process, they may violate the admonition in
Boerne that "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by chang-
ing what the right is. ' 386
It is also uncertain whether the incidence of punitive damage awards
in product liability cases provides the extensive legislative record needed
to comply with Boerne's mandate that the statutory remedy "be consid-
ered in light of the evil presented. ' 38 7 Although supporters of tort re-
forms can point to a number of instances of harmful punitive damage
awards, 388 opponents can also cite studies detailing the limited incidence
of punitive damage awards. 389 Further, in considering whether the stan-
dard for reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards
would require the federal courts to entangle themselves in innumerable
disputes, Gore found such concerns to be "premature at best ' 390 because
of the "small number of punitive damages questions that we have re-
viewed in recent years, together with the fact that this is the first case in
decades in which we have found that a punitive damages award exceeds
the constitutional limit .... ,,391
384 See supra note 278 & 279. The Senate Product Liability Proposal caps the amount of
punitive damages that may be awarded against "small businesses" and certain individuals.
385 Id.
386 65 U.S.L.W at 4615.
387 Id. at 4618.
388 See S. Rep. No. 105-32, at 46-47 (1997) (noting that excessive punitive damage
awards were overturned involving the drug Benedictin and Sabin polio vaccine; and that recent
studies by Texas Policy Foundation and Institute for Civil Justice had found marked increases
in the frequency and size of punitive damage awards in Dallas and Houston and the size of
punitive damage awards in Chicago). See also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 ("[w]e note once again
our concern about punitive damages that 'run wild."'); Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont
v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[a]wards of punitive
damages are skyrocketing [and] the threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on
the research and development of new products.").
389 See S. Rep. No. 105-32, at 74-75 (1997) (dissenting views noting a study by Dr.
Stephen Daniels showed that between 1981-1985, punitive damages were only awarded in
4.9% of the cases reviewed and from 1988-1990 were only awarded in 4.8% of cases re-
viewed; study by Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig reviewing all product liabil-
ity awards from 1965-1990 in federal and state courts and finding only 355 cases of punitive
damage awards in 25 years).
390 64 U.S.L.W. at 4343 n.41.
391 Id.
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2. Fifth Amendment 392
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law,"393 a proscription
which has been held to include an equal protection component.3 94 In the
past, claimants have unsuccessfully sought to challenge federal tort re-
forms on both due process (e.g., claiming the law was unfair as a sub-
stantive or a procedural matter)395 and equal protection (e.g., the law
provides differential treatment for classes of tort claimants) grounds.396
Assuming the courts continue to apply the lenient "rational basis test,"397
plaintiffs challenging federal tort reforms under the Fifth Amendment
will be placed in the difficult posture of overcoming the asserted legisla-
tive justifications. This is a standard claimants have been unable to meet
in Supreme Court cases such as Usery398 and Duke Power.399
392 For an analysis of Fifth Amendment issues in the context of tort reform, see Steven J.
Werber, The Constitutional Dimension of a National Products Liability Statute of Repose, 40
VILL. L. REV. 985 (1995) (federal products liability statute of repose likely to violate equal
protection because it cannot be supported under a rationale basis test); Marco de Sae Silva,
Constitutional Challenges to Washington's Limit on Non-economic Damages in Cases of
Personal Injury or Death, 63 WASH. L. REV. 653 (1988) (caps on non-economic damages
appear not to violate due process and equal protection because only minimal level of judicial
scrutiny will be applied); Mary Ann Willis, Comment, Limitation on Recovery of Damages:
Medical Malpractice Cases: A Violation of Equal Protection?, 54 U. CINN. L. REV. 1329
(1986) (concluding that state limits on medical malpractice awards likely violate equal
protection).
393 U.S. Const. amend. V.
394 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (Fifth Amendment due process found to
incorporate equal protection guarantees in case involving public school desegregation by the
Federal Government in the District of Columbia).
395 Courts have varied on whether to differentiate between "substantive" and "procedural"
due process when scrutinizing federal tort reforms. See, e.g., Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (applying a generic due process analysis); In re Consolidated United States
Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F.2d at 989-91 (separately analyzing and rejecting sub-
stantive and procedural due process claims).
396 A separate due process issue which has arisen in those tort reform laws which have
been reviewed by the courts is whether the law operates as an unconstitutional taking. In the
case of the initiatives described in this article, it seems doubtful a credible taking argument
could be advanced, given Hammond's holding that a taking claim would not lie under the
Atomic Testing Liability Act unless the claimant had been forced to forfeit a "final, unreview-
able judgment." See 786 F.2d at 12.
397 See Usery, 428 U.S. at 15; Carr, 539 F.2d at 959; Thomason, 438 U.S. at 84; Sparks,
574 F.2d at 1310; In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 786 F.2d
at 991; and O'Conner & TMI, 940 F.2d at 1102. But see Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555
P.2d 399 (1976); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (State courts applying the so-called
"intermediate scrutiny" test where the tort reform is seen as depriving parties of their "funda-
mental" right to a jury trial).
398 In Usery, 428 U.S. at 33, the Court granted strong deference to Congress in its assess-
ment concerning the efficacy of competing expert opinions: "mhe reliability of negative X-
ray evidence was debated forcefully on both sides before the Congress, and the Operators here
suggest nothing new to add to the debate; they are simply dissatisfied with Congress' conclu-
sion." Id.
399 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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In addition to the issue of whether a particular tort reform is seen as
"rational," plaintiffs may also argue that the law does not provide a legis-
lative quid pro quo. The latter issue raises two separate questions:
whether the reform provides any requisite benefit or advantage to offset
the forfeiture of common law rights; and whether any such quid pro quo
is required as a constitutional matter. With regard to the first question, a
strong argument can be made that several recently enacted reforms such
as the General Aviation Act, Volunteer Protection Act, Food Donation,
Biomaterials Access Assurance Act and Y2K Act 4° . do not provide any
offsetting legal benefits, at least to the parties directly harmed by the loss
of their common law rights. Unlike the Price-Anderson Act upheld in
Duke Power,4° 1 these laws provide no recourse to a secure source of
funds or waiver of any of the defendant's legal rights, and in contrast to
the Swine Flu Act, Atomic Testing Liability Act, Westfall Act and vari-
ous other federal laws immunizing volunteers associated with federal ac-
tivities4°2 the laws provide no substitution of the United States as a
defendant for any harm caused by volunteer negligence. A related argu-
ment was articulated in Carr, when the Fourth Circuit observed that the
Federal Drivers Act benefited all government employees - even potential
400 It could be argued that several recently enacted and pending tort reform proposals,
such as the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act and the Tobacco Settlement provide plaintiffs
with no direct offsetting benefits. However, some may contend that individuals bringing to-
bacco lawsuits may benefit from provisions intended to provide for the development of a more
orderly tobacco liability payout system and the potential of receiving any unused liability
funds allocated by the presidential commission. See supra notes 313-315 and accompanying
text.
401 See 438 U.S. at 90. Although the Volunteer Protection Act permits states to adopt
laws insuring that non-profits make a secure source of funds available in the event of injury,
unlike Price-Anderson, the Act does not insure that such security is made available.
402 See e.g., (1) Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.
§ 233 (g) & (o) (1994) (health centers and their officers, employees, and contractors and health
clinic professionals); (2) National Service Trust Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12651b(f) & 12651g (a)(B)
(1994) (enacted in 1993) (board members and volunteers in the National and Community Ser-
vice program); (3) Take Pride in America Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4604 (c)(2) (1994) (Take Pride in
America Act volunteers) (enacted in 1990); (4) Support for East European Democracy Act of
1989, 22 U.S.C. § 5422 (c)(2)(A) (1994) (volunteers providing technical assistance to Poland
or Hungary); (5) Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1737 (f)
(1994) (Bureau of Land Management volunteers); (6) Domestic Volunteer Service Act of
1973, 42 U.S.C. § 5055(f)(3) (1994) (VISTA volunteers); (7) Volunteers in the National For-
ests Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 558c (b) (1994) (Forest Service volunteers); (8) Volunteers in
Parks Act of 1969, 16 U.S.C. § 18i () (1994) (National Parks volunteers); (9) Peace Corps
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2504(h)(1994) (enacted in 1961) (Peace Corps volunteers); (10) Fish and
Wildlife Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. § 742f(c)(4) (1994) (volunteers in Fish and Wildlife Service
or National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration programs); (11) Federally Supported
Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 203 note (Supp. 1 1995); and (12) 18
U.S.C.A. § 1955 note (West Supp. IV 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 247b (1976) (repealed 1978); 42
U.S.C. § 2212 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1994).
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plaintiffs - by providing them with protection against liability from auto-
mobile accidents.403
If these tort reforms are to be upheld in the face of a quid pro quo
requirement, their defenders will likely resort to the argument that any
necessary benefits may extend to society or persons who benefit from
volunteerism generally, rather than impaired claimants directly. This is
the contention accepted by the California Supreme Court in Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group,4° 4 in upholding that state's medical mal-
practice reforms4°5 against constitutional challenge, In Fein, the Califor-
nia court stated "even if due process principles required some 'quid pro
quo' to support the statute, it would be difficult to say that the preserva-
tion of a viable medical malpractice insurance industry in this state was
not an adequate benefit for the detriment the legislation imposes on mal-
practice plaintiffs. '40 6
In contrast, other tort reforms such as the Amtrak Act and the Sen-
ate Product Liability Proposal407 could be construed as providing a di-
rectly offsetting benefit to affected claimants. The constitutional
difficulty with respect to these proposals may come from establishing
that the quantum of offsetting statutory benefits approaches that found in
Duke Power. For example, while both the Amtrak Act and the Price-
Anderson Act require potential defendants to provide insurance in the
event of an accident,40 8 the Amtrak Act contains no waiver of any com-
mon law defenses and does not obligate the Federal Government to pro-
vide any indemnification or commit itself to take any actions to protect
the public in the event of an accident.40 9 In Duke Power, the Court
found such assurances to be a "fair and reasonable substitute for the un-
403 See 5 U.S.C. § 8116 (c).
404 695 P.2d 665, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 474 U.S.
892. See also Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164 (capping attorneys' fees in
medical malpractice actions), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 990 (1985).
405 The reforms upheld in Fein capped non-economic damages at $250,000 and modified
the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases. 695 P.2d at 665.
406 Il at 160 n.18. Justice'White dissented from plaintiff's appeal of Fein, finding there
was a clear split concerning the constitutionality of damage limitations in medical malpractice
cases, noting, "[o]ne of the masons for the division among the state courts is [the quid pro quo]
question left unresolved by this Court in Duke Power...." See Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 474 U.S. 892, 894 (1985).
407 Another issue presented by the Senate Product Liability Proposal is whether caps on
punitive damages, as opposed to compensatory damages, are the type of restrictions subject to
constitutional challenge. Some commentators have concluded that there is no constitutional
right to seek punitive damages. See Janet V. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus Plaintiffs'
Rights: The Constitutional Battle Over Statutory Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J 405 (1995); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Puni-
tive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983).
408 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (c) (1994); 49 U.S.C. § 28103 (c).
409 These provisions are included in the Price-Anderson Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210
(n)(1), 2210 (c) (1994).
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certain recovery of damages from a utility or component
manufacturer." 4 10
Some of the potential legal benefits available to plaintiffs under the
Senate Product Liability Proposal include the provision of a two-way
preemptive federal statute of limitations running from the time the harm
was actually discovered (or should have been discovered) rather than the
date of the actual harm, and standards for the award of punitive damages
and statutes of repose which can also operate to preempt some current
laws which are less favorable to plaintiffs. 41' A potential constitutional
infirmity with this proposal is the class of claimants which would benefit
from these provisions is not necessarily the same as those whose rights
will be impaired by other proposed liability limitations. This stands in
contrast to Duke Power, where the persons subject to forfeiture of their
common law rights in the event of a nuclear accident appear to constitute
the same class of individuals benefiting from the liability waivers con-
tained in the Price-Anderson Act.4 12
While defenders of these tort reforms may have some difficulty es-
tablishing that the reforms adequately provide for an offsetting legal ben-
efit of the type found in Duke Power, they may be more readily able to
claim a quid pro quo is not a constitutional requirement in the first in-
stance. Although as a formal matter in New York Central4 13 and Duke
Power4 14 the Supreme Court reserved the question of whether a quid pro
quo is necessary for compliance with due process and equal protection,
there is a significant degree of dicta skeptical of such a requirement. In
Duke Power, for example, before finding that the Price-Anderson Act
provided an adequate quid pro quo, the Court noted, "it is not at all clear
that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted
compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or
provide a reasonably just substitute for the common-law or state tort law
remedies it replaces. '4 15 In upholding the Swine Flu Act against a con-
stitutional due process challenge, the Fifth Circuit in Ducharme observed
"[I]egislation has even been upheld where no remedy was substituted in
place of the cause of action that was taken away. '4 16 There also is senti-
410 348 U.S. at 91.
411 See supra notes 280-284 & 294 and accompanying text.
412 The Senate Product Liability Proposal can also be contrasted with the Warsaw Con-
vention, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), which limits recoverable damages in exchange for providing all
plaintiffs with a guaranteed recovery through its strict liability provisions.
413 See 243 U.S. 188.
414 See 438 U.S. 59.
415 Id. at 88.
416 Ducharme, 574 F.2d at 1310. See also Carr, 280 U.S. at 122. But see Sparks, 341 F.
Supp. at 416 ("a replacement or substitution of remedies, while perhaps not technically neces-
sary for due process, is nonetheless even more indicative of the satisfaction of due process
requirements."); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 at 430 ("Oregon's abrogation of
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ment in a number of cases upholding state laws altering common law
rights such as Munn v. Illinois417 and Silver v. Silver418 for the proposi-
tions that: "[a] person has no property, no vested interest in any rule of
the common law"419 and "[t]he Constitution does not forbid the creation
of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common
law, to attain a permissible legislative object."420
3. Seventh Amendment421
The Seventh Amendment provides, "[i]n suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be other-
wise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law."422 The cases in which federal tort reforms
have been directly subject to constitutional challenge to date do not pro-
vide a great deal of guidance concerning the scope and operation of the
Seventh Amendment. The Employees' Liability Cases did not reach the
issue of the Seventh Amendment's application to the 1906 Employers'
Liability Act because the law was invalidated on other grounds, while the
issue was not raised in The Second Employees' Liability Cases,423
Usery,424 or Duke Power.425 While the Seventh Amendment issue was
raised in challenges to the Federal Drivers Act, Swine Flu Act, and the
Atomic Testing Liability Act, it was rejected in those instances because
the Seventh Amendment was held not to apply to laws substituting an
administrative remedy against the United States.426
Notwithstanding the lack of direct legal precedent in tort reform
cases, defenders of proposals such as the House Medical Malpractice
well-established common law protections against arbitrary deprivations of property raises a
presumption that its procedures violate the Due Process Clause.").
417 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
418 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
419 Munn, 94 U.S. at 134.
420 Silver, 280 U.S. at 122.
421 For an analysis of Seventh Amendment issues in the context of tort reforms, see
Colleen P. Murphy, Determining the Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority,
74 TEX. L. REV. 345 (1995) (raising questions concerning Congress' ability to cap, but not
eliminate right to seek compensatory damages); James F. Tiu, Challenging Medical
Malpractice Damage Awards on Seventh Amendment Grounds: Attack in Search of a
Rationale, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 213 (1990) (Federal courts have not found that statutory limits
on damages in medical malpractice actions violate the Seventh Amendment); Paul B. Weiss,
Comment, Reforming Tort Reform: Is there Substance to the Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH.
U. L. REV. 737 (1989) (disagreeing with courts recognizing legislative power to impose
damage caps).
422 U.S. Const. amend. VII.
423 223 U.S. 1.
424 428 U.S. 1.
425 438 U.S. 59.
426 See 225 F. Supp at 882; 574 F.2d at 1311; 786 F.2d at 15.
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Proposal's cap on non-economic damages427 (which appears to implicate
jury trial rights most directly)4 28 should be able to make several support-
ing legal arguments. They could first assert that to the extent the Seventh
Amendment may apply to a particular federal tort reform, it would only
limit Congress' ability to cap damages in diversity cases brought in fed-
eral court, rather than its ability to alter underlying state court jury rights.
This concept is based on the Supreme Court's 1916 decision in Minneap-
olis & St. Louis RR v. Bombolis,4 29 which upheld application of the 1908
Employers' Liability Act in state courts even though Minnesota law per-
mitted civil claims to be adjudicated by less than a unanimous jury (in
derogation of the common law).430 In rejecting the constitutional argu-
ment, the Bombolis Court noted that the Seventh Amendment was ex-
pressly limited to "proceedings in the courts of the United States." 431
Second, defenders of damage caps may assert that based on the
Court's 1987 decision in Tull v. United States432 statutory caps should be
deemed to constitute "legal' rather than "factual" determinations which
are not subject to the Seventh Amendment. In Tull, although the Court
found that actions brought under the Clean Water Act 433 were generally
subject to the Seventh Amendment,434 it ultimately concluded the Sev-
427 The House Medical Malpractice Proposal would cap economic damages at $250,000.
See supra note 299.
428 A number of federal tort reforms can be claimed to abrogate Seventh Amendment jury
trial protections by legislatively resolving matters previously considered by a jury at common
law. For example, the Emerson Food Donation Act and the Volunteer Protection Act both
eliminate liability for ordinary negligence; the General Aviation Act and the Senate Product
Liability Proposal eliminate tort liability where a statute of repose applies and the Senate
Product Liability Proposal, House Medical Malpractice Proposal and the Tobacco Settlement
would cap or eliminate punitive damages. But see Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Consti-
tutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723 (1993) (Sev-
enth Amendment does not require juries to assess punitive damages because determination is
unguided by meaningful standards).
429 241 U.S. 211 (1916). See also Simler v. Connor, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (in federal
district court diversity of citizenship action, federal rather than state law governs in determin-
ing whether the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial).
430 Minnesota law permits five members of a six person jury to reach a verdict in a civil
action if the jury has deliberated for twelve hours without reaching a unanimous verdict. See
241 U.S. 211.
431 241 U.S. at 217. The Court also wrote that its decision was premised on the grounds
that "the first ten Amendments, including of course the Seventh, are not concerned with state
action and deal only with federal action." Id.
432 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
433 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994).
434 Although Clean Water Act actions were statutory in nature, the Court found the Sev-
enth Amendment also applied to actions "that are analogous to 'suits at common law."' 481
U.S. at 417. In the case of the Clean Water Act, the Court observed that although legal actions
brought under it were similar to actions traditionally brought at law (such as debt actions) and
equity (such as nuisance actions), the "'more important"' determination for Seventh Amend-
ment purposes was the nature of the relief being sought. Id. at 421 (citations omitted). Since a
civil penalty was traditionally sought in a court of law, the Court concluded that the core
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enth Amendment did not apply to the civil penalty determinations at is-
sue under the Act. The Court found that since the assessment of civil
penalties involved neither the " 'substance of a common-law right to a
trial by jury' nor a 'fundamental element of a jury trial"' 435 it was not a
required jury function under the Seventh Amendment.436 In a footnote to
its opinion, the Court suggested even more broadly, "[n]othing in the
[Seventh] Amendment's language suggests that the right to a jury trial
extends to the remedy phase of a civil trial."'437 Relying in part on this
footnote, the Fourth Circuit in Boyd v. Bulala438 held caps on damages
did not violate the right to a jury trial, observing "it is not the role of the
jury to determine the legal consequences of its factual findings .... That
is a matter for the legislature.' 439 Similarly in Franklin v. Mazda Motor
Corp.,44° a Maryland district court wrote that "U]uries always find facts
on a matrix of laws given to them by the legislature and by precedent and
it can hardly be argued that limitations imposed by law are a usurpation
of the jury function."'44 1
Third, defenders of damage caps may argue that since legislatures
have open-ended authority under the Seventh Amendment to eliminate a
right of action completely, they should also have the authority to elimi-
nate certain jury prerogatives. This is premised on the Court's 1917 de-
cision in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,442 upholding against
Seventh Amendment challenge the constitutionality of a Washington law
eliminating causes of actions by employees against employers (and re-
underlying question of legal responsibility should be heard by a jury under the Seventh
Amendment. Id. at 425.
435 Id.
436 Since the text of the Seventh Amendment is silent on the question of whether a jury
determination is required with respect to the remedy phase of a trial, the Court reasoned the
"answer must depend on whether the jury must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to
preserve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.'"Id at 426 (citations omit-
ted). The Court went on to argue since Congress had the clear authority to fix the amount of
the civil penalty, it could also delegate that authority to the court, particularly in actions such
as those under the Clean Water Act which involved "highly discretionary calculations." Id. at
427.
437 481 U.S. at 426 n.9 (citations omitted). The Court also observed, "[w~e have been
presented with no evidence that the Framers meant to extend the right to a jury to the remedy
phase of a civil trial." Md
438 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
439 Id. at 1196 (citations omitted).
440 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989). Both Boyd and Franklin raised Seventh Amend-
ment issues because they involved diversity actions brought in federal court.
441 Id. at 1331. See also Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1989) (Seventh
Amendment does not apply to the Virgin Island's cap on non-economic damages in medical
malpractice actions because the second clause of the Seventh Amendment -preventing facts
tried by the jury from being reexamined-apply to courts, not legislatures).
442 243 U.S. at 219.
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placing them with a workers' compensation regime).443 More recently,
federal courts in Boyd and Franklin utilized supplemental arguments ex-
tending this line of reasoning to validate state laws limiting damage
awards. In Boyd the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Vir-
ginia's cap on damages, reasoning "[i]f a legislature may completely
abolish a cause of action without violating the right of trial by jury, we
think it permissibly may limit damages recoverable for a cause of action
as well."444 Similarly, in Franklin the district court wrote, "[t]he power
of the legislature to define, augment, or even abolish complete causes of
action must necessarily include the power to define by statute what dam-
ages may be recovered by a litigant with a particular cause of action."445
Those challenging damage caps on Seventh Amendment grounds
may attempt to respond to these lines of argument through a variety of
contentions. First, rather than giving Congress free rein to deny jury
rights in state courts, a closer reading of Bombolis may indicate it should
more properly be seen as an effort to limit congressional preemption of
state court procedures. For example, language in Bombolis stating the
Seventh Amendment should not be permitted to operate to void state
court procedures lest "both federal and state courts ... by fluctuating
hybridization be bereft of all real, independent existence" 446 indicate
more of a respect for federalism than antipathy to state jury trial rights.
With regard to the argument that damage caps involve legal rather
than factual determinations, persons challenging the constitutionality of
caps may point to several cases undercutting Tull and its progeny. In the
1935 case Dimick v. Schiedt447 the Court held the federal practice of
additur, by which a federal judge believing a jury award to be unduly low
allowed defendants to choose between an increase in a damage award or
a new trial, unconstitutional. Finding no evidence that English common
law courts had the authority to increase the amount of jury verdicts,448
the Court held that increasing the amount of a jury award was a question
443 The Court found that the Seventh Amendment did not apply where a cause of action
was completely eliminated, writing "[a]s between employee and employer the act abolishes all
right of recovery in ordinary cases, and therefore leaves nothing to be tried by jury." Id. at 235.
444 877 F.2d at 1196 (citations omitted).
445 704 F. Supp. at 1331.
446 241 U.S. at 221.
447 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
448 The Court observed "[i]n order to ascertain the scope and meaning of the Seventh
Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established at the
time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791." Id. at 476. The Court went on
to note that other than isolated exceptions it had found no historical evidence of English com-
mon law courts being able to increase the amount of a jury verdict, on either an absolute or
conditional basis. /M. at 476-77.
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of fact" 9 protected by the Seventh Amendment. 450 Moreover, district
court decisions invalidating state damage caps in Boyd v. Bulala451 and
Reuwer v. Hunter452 may have some residual intellectual import despite
their being overruled by the Fourth Circuit. In Boyd the district court
reasoned that "[s]ince the assessment of damages is a fact issue ... a
limitation on [their] performance... is a limitation on the role of the
jury. '453 Reuwer distinguished Tull on the grounds it concerned "the
assessment of a civil penalty"454 rather than "the determination of dam-
ages" 455 and went on to find that "[i]n terms of the jury's role, history
justifies no. distinction between the liability and the remedy phases of a
trial of a common-law action." 456
Third, those challenging damage caps may seek to distinguish
Mountain Timber by asserting that rather than allowing for a legislature
to completely eliminate common law rights, the Seventh Amendment
merely permits the legislature to do so where it provides a comparable
substitute regime, such as the workers compensation laws described in
that case. As for the corollary claim that the greater legislative power
(e.g., abrogating causes of action completely) includes the lesser (e.g.,
capping damages), this arguably proves too much. If Congress had such
broad ranging authority, it could circumscribe any aspect of a common
law or other legal action, thereby reducing the Seventh Amendment to a
nullity.
Ultimately it appears damage caps are likely to present another con-
stitutional case of first impression for the Supreme Court. The trends in
the relevant cases, however, would appear to favor those defending caps.
The Court has previously countenanced the erosion of jury trial rights in
the form of directed verdicts, six-person juries, and liberal use of collat-
eral estoppel, among other procedural devices.457 Moreover, the
Supreme Court precedent most favorable to defenders of caps Tull
(1987) is far more recent than the Dimick decision (1935). While lower
federal court decisions concerning state damage caps reach varying con-
449 "The controlling distinction between the power of the court and that of the jury is that
the former has the power to determine the law and the latter to determine the facts." Id. at 486.
450 According to the Court, "where the verdict is too small, an increase by the court is an
addition of something which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict." IL
451 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), reaff'd, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987), affd
in part, rev'd in part, questions certified, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
452 684 F. Supp. 1340 (1988).
453 647 F. Supp. at 789.
454 684 F. Supp. at 1344.
455 Id.
456 Id.
457 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (directed verdict); Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (six-person juries); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979) (collateral estoppel).
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clusions, the circuit court precedent on this matter -the Fourth Circuit
decision in Boyd v. Bulala458-favors the defenders of caps as well.
4. Tenth Amendment459
Courts have previously not been accommodating of Tenth Amend-
ment federalism concerns460 in the context of federal tort reform laws.
The Second Employers' Liability Cases rejected the federalism conten-
tion raised in that case, finding that the Supremacy Clause made it clear
that laws made "in pursuance of the Constitution" prevailed over any
conflicting state laws.461 Tenth Amendment concerns were also dis-
missed in lower court decisions reviewing the constitutionality of the
Swine Flu Act 462 and Atomic Testing Liability Act.463
However, in recent years the general nature of federalism concerns
has expanded. In 1992 in New York v. United States,464 the Court invali-
dated a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 (the "Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act') 465
requiring states to assume ownership of radioactive waste or accept legal
liability for damages caused by the waste. Under New York v. United
States, even if a particular law is found to constitute a valid exercise of
Congress' Commerce Clause authority, it may still be struck down if it
"commandeer[s] the legislative processes of the states by directly com-
pelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. '466
These concerns were reiterated more recently in Printz v. United
States,467 where the Court invalidated portions of the Brady Handgun
458 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
459 For an analysis of Tenth Amendment and related issues in the context of proposed
product liability reforms, see Jeffrey White, Does the Products Bill Collide with Tenth
Amendment?, Trial, Nov. 1997, at 30; Cynthia C. Lebow, Federalism and Product Liability
Reform: A Warning Not Heeded, 64 TENN. L. REV. 665 (1997); Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth
Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44 Vill. L. Rev. 1
(1999).
460 The Tenth Amendment provides "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
461 223 U.S. at 53. The Employers' Liability Cases also found that Congress had the
authority to enact a law dealing with master-servant relationships so long as it involved inter-
state commerce. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552A (1977); The Employers' Liability
Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1907) and The Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New
York), 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Pub. L. No. 59-219, 34 Stat. 232 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60)
(1906) (repealed 1907); 207 U.S. 463 (1907).
462 See 431 F. Supp. at 419.
463 See 786 F.2d at 15.
464 505 U.S. at 144.
465 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-2021j (1994).
466 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
467 117 S.Ct. 2365; 138 L.Ed. 2d 914; 65 U.S.L.W. 4731 (U.S. June 27, 1997) (5-4
decision).
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Violence Protection Act 468 requiring local law enforcement officials to
conduct background checks on prospective gun purchasers.
Whether any tort reforms are found to be unconstitutional on Tenth
Amendment grounds is likely to depend in part on whether the Court is
willing to extend and build upon the federalism concerns expressed in
New York v. United States and Printz. As the case law currently stands,
defenders of tort reform measures are likely to assert that a distinction
can readily be drawn between the holding in New York v. United
States-prohibiting federal commandeering of the state legislative pro-
cess by compelling the enactment of a regulatory program-and federal
tort reforms which merely require state courts to honor federal law. The
Court itself observed as much when it distinguished a series of federal
laws which were enforceable in state courts from the Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act:
These cases involve no more than an application of the Supremacy
Clause's provisions that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land," enforceable in every state. More to the point, all involve congres-
sional regulation of individuals, not congressional requirements that
states regulate. Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense,
direct state judgments to enforce them, but this sort of federal "direction"
of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause. No
comparable constitutional provision authorizes Congress to command
state legislatures to regulate. 469
Moreover, in Printz the Supreme Court continued to distinguish be-
tween legislation directly commandeering the legislature and the mere
use by Congress of the state courts. In examining the laws enacted in the
first several Congresses in order to clarify the legislative history of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights, the Court identified a series of federal
laws which made use of the state courts, writing, "[t]hese early laws es-
tablish, at most, that the Constitution was originally understood to permit
imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescrip-
tions .... It is understandable why courts should have been viewed
distinctively in this regard; unlike legislatures and executives, they ap-
plied the law of other sovereigns all the time."470
468 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994).
469 505 U.S. at 178-79. Lebow, supra note 460 at 689 concludes that last year's product
liability bill would have violated Tenth Amendment federalism principles, and distinguishes
this line of cases, in part because it "directs the state courts to actually alter state tort law and
related procedures as mandated by Congress."
470 65 U.S.L.W. at 4733-34. It may be significant, however, that the laws cited by the
Court in Printz involved using state courts to effectuate uniquely federal policies, such as those
relating to immigration, rather than matters which typically fell within state prerogatives, such
as tort law.
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On the other hand, parties seeking to challenge these tort reforms
may assert that rather than provide for an alternative liability scheme (as
the 1908 Act did) or substitute the United States as a defendant pursuant
to the Federal Torts Claims Act (as the Federal Drivers Act, Swine Flu
Act, and Atomic Testing Liability Act did), the reforms impermissibly
set forth a limited number of federal limitations on liability, while reserv-
ing the remainder of the legal issues to state law.471 One of the problems
with the Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act identified by the
Court in New York v. United States was that "where the Federal Govern-
ment directs the states to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear
the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised
the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifica-
tions of their decision." 472
A related contention is that unlike the laws early federal laws en-
forceable in state courts distinguished in Printz, recent tort reforms can
be said to be more intrusive in that they affirmatively limit the applica-
tion of state law. In a recent article in TRIAL Magazine, Jeffrey White,
the Associate General Counsel of the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, argues that the early laws represent "instances in which Con-
gress established a federal cause of action or federal administrative regu-
latory scheme affecting private conduct and preempted conflicting state
law. In none of these statutes did Congress purport to leave state law in
place while attempting to modify its content."473
Potentially more problematic may be the fact that specific proposals
such as the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act, the Tobacco Settlement
and the Y2K Act impose an elaborate set of procedural mandates directly
on state courts with respect to state causes of action. This, it can be
asserted, goes beyond requiring the supremacy of federal legal standards
471 The Court in New York v. United States also noted a constitutional line between
congressional and state legislative responsibilities: "The allocation of power contained in the
Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes congress to regulate interstate commerce directly;
it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate com-
merce." 505 U.S. at 166.
472 505 U.S. at 169. Cf. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomlins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Congress
has no power to declare state substantive rules of common law applicable in a state ... be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. Moreover, no clause in the Constitution purports
to confer such a power upon the federal courts."); Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945) (Federal courts bound by state statutes of limitations since they are substantive, not
procedural).
473 White, supra note 460, at 32. One could argue that The Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912), constituted a tort reform which altered state law in eliminating
certain common law employer liability defenses. However, the Majority in Printz read this
precedent somewhat narrowly when it said "[t]he Second Employers' Liability Cases stand for
the proposition that a state court must entertain a claim arising under federal law only 'when
its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local law is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked
in conformity with those laws.' "65 U.S.L.W. at 4733, citing Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S at 56-57.
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by proscribing detailed and potentially costly procedures on the state
courts. For example, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act specifies
detailed rules concerning motions to dismiss, limits discovery pending
ruling on such motions, requires that rulings be made solely on the basis
of pleadings and affidavits, and specifies rules for consideration of sum-
mary judgment and stay motions.474 The Tobacco Settlement prevents
states from allowing any form of consolidation of tobacco claims, even if
this is the least costly and most efficient means of resolving such law-
suits. 475 The Tobacco Settlement also prevents state courts from resolv-
ing attorney client privilege and trade secret disputes regarding tobacco
documents and alters state court evidentiary rules by prohibiting the ad-
mission or discovery of any evidence concerning "reduced-risk" tobacco
products.476 The Y2K Act also mandates a variety of procedural rules
upon state courts, such as notice, "cool-down" and heightened pleading
requirements and prohibits state courts from considering most forms of
Y2K class actions. 477
Although we are aware of no direct Supreme Court precedent re-
garding whether Congress may mandate procedural rules on state courts
concerning state causes of action, plaintiffs will be able to point to dicta
in several recent decisions concerning the preemptive effect of civil
rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 indicating that such re-
quirements may well cross the constitutional line. In Felder v. Casey,478
the Court observed that it is an "unassailable proposition .... that states
may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own
courts." In Johnson v. Fankell,479 the Court reiterated what it termed
"the general rule 'bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state
control of state judicial procedure. . . that federal law takes state courts
as it finds them.'"480 The Johnson Court also observed that judicial re-
spect for the principal of federalism "is at its apex when we confront a
claim that federal law requires a state to undertake something as funda-
474 See Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 872 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1997).
475 See 12.3 TPLR at 3.221, Title VIII.B.2.
476 See 12.3 TPLR at 3.232, Appendix VIII.3; 3.221, Title VIII (B)(7).
477 See Y2K Act §§ 7, 8 & 15.
478 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (Wisconsin notice of claim statute found to be inconsistent
with and preempted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
479 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 held not to preempt Idaho procedural rules
concerning appealability of orders).
480 Id. at 1805 (citing Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990)) quoting Henry Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)).
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mental as restructuring the operation of its courts"48 1 and "it is a matter
for each state to decide how to structure its judicial system. '482
Because of such concerns, during hearings concerning the Tobacco
Settlement Professor Tribe testified "[f]or Congress directly to regulate
the procedures used by state courts in adjudicating state-law tort
claims-to forbid them, for example, from applying their generally ap-
plicable class action procedures in cases involving tobacco suits-would
raise serious questions under the Tenth Amendment and principles of
federalism." 483 Although the Tobacco Settlement provides for removal
to federal court of tobacco liability suits for which class action certifica-
tion is sought4 4-presumably in an effort to ameliorate the Tenth
Amendment concerns-this mechanism may still be subject to further
constitutional problems. Such problems as whether it constitutes an im-
permissible attempt to extend federal jurisdiction where it is otherwise
lacking in violation of Article I of the Constitution. This is similar to
the issue the Third and Seventh Circuit dealt with in the context of the
1988 Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act, which converted nuclear
accident claims into federal causes of action.485
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last several years, Congress has enacted a series of federal tort
reform laws. These statutes have partially preempted state tort law in the
481 Id. at 1807.
482 Id. n.13. For their part, defendants may attempt to assert that procedural requirements
such as those set forth in the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act and the Tobacco Settlement
are no more burdensome on state courts than the comparative negligence determinations re-
quired under the 1908 Employers' Liability Act and that given the Court's recent decision in
Amchem Products v. George Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed. 2d 689, 65 U.S.L.W. 4635
(1997) (narrowing ability to obtain class certifications in mass product liability cases under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), it is unlikely the class action rules would prove to be of
significant benefit in tobacco litigation in any event.
483 The Global Tobacco Settlement: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
1051 Cong., (1997) (Statement of Lawrence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School).
484 See 12.3 TPLR at 3.221, Title VIII.B.2. The Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S.
1414, 105th Cong. (1997) contains a general prohibition on class actions, along with a mecha-
nism for removal by a defendant of "an action that involves a violation of [the class action
prohibition] ... to an appropriate federal court."
485 See 13 F.3d at 1099, 940 F.2d at 857. For an analysis of the possible Article IT issue
in the context of the Tobacco Settlement, see The Global Tobacco Settlement: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., (1997) (statement of Lawrence H. Tribe,
Tyler Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) ("Although Congress may as a general proposi-
tion regulate the the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it may not by statute enlarge their Article
III jurisdiction .... Accordingly, I do not think that the proposed statute could be applied to
permit the removal of an action where federal jurisdiction were otherwise lacking"); Hearing
on the Civil Liability Portions of the Proposed Tobacco Settlement Before the House Comm.
On the Judiciary, 105"' Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) (statement of James F. Pfander, University of
Illinois College of Law) ("The existence of a federal question, even by way of defense, should
solve any Article I problem with the removal scheme").
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areas of general aviation aircraft liability (the General Aviation Revitali-
zation Act of 1994); donation of food for distribution to the needy (the
Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act); volunteer activity
generally (the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997); public railway trans-
portation (Section 161 of the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of
1997); medical implant supplies (the Biomaterials Access Assurance
Act) and year 2000 computer failures (the Y2K Act).486 At the same
time, Congress has considered a number of more far-reaching proposals,
including legislation preempting state laws concerning product liability,
medical malpractice, and tobacco litigation. 487
In general, these enacted and pending reforms represent a third
wave of federal tort reform. They seek to isolate a particular area of tort
law (such as product liability or medical malpractice) or a sub-area (such
as the general aviation or biomaterials supplies aspects of product liabil-
ity), and carve out a set of protections designed to minimize the liability
of defendants as compared to what their liability would be under state
law. While the justification asserted for these reforms-encouraging
beneficial social and economic activities-is similar to that proffered for
earlier phases of tort reform, the nature of several of the proposals is
sufficiently different to present a number of new constitutional issues.
With regard to the Commerce Clause, laws such as the Food Dona-
tion Act and Volunteer Protection Act will not only have a significant
impact on intrastate activity, but also regulate non-commercial, volunteer
activity. The question presented by these laws is whether the Commerce
Clause permits preemption of state law where Congress finds there is a
connection to interstate commerce, or the courts are required to consider
whether the nexus is simply too tenuous to justify intrusion on the tradi-
tional state law tort system.
In the event Commerce Clause authority is struck down in the con-
text of a particular tort reform, courts may also be presented with the
issue of whether the law is authorized by Congress' power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, this issue may arise
with respect to punitive damage limitations, given the Court's recent de-
cisions in BMW of North America v. Gore488 and Honda Motor Co. v.
486 See Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552-54 (1994) (codified at'49 U.S.C. § 40101
note (1994));Pub. L. No. 104-210, 110 Stat. 3011 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1791 (West Supp.
1998));Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 218 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14501- 14505 (West
Supp. III 1997));Pub. L. No. 105-134, § 111 Stat. 2570 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 28103
(West Supp. 1998)); Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-230, 112
Stat. 1519 (1998) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1601-1606 (1998)); Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37,
113 Stat. 6601 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17 (1999)).
487 See The Product Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105' Cong. (1998); Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, H.R. 2015, 105' Cong. (1997); Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement,
12.3 TPLR 3.203 (June 20, 1997).
488 64 U.S.L.W. at 4339.
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Oberg.489 The critical question is whether these tort reforms would be
viewed as merely implementing these court-made constitutional con-
straints, or whether the tort reforms represent an entirely new legislative
restrictions on the states.
In terms of the Fifth Amendment, a number of recent tort reforms
would abrogate common law rights without providing any direct offset-
ting legal benefit to plaintiffs. There is some doubt as to whether a legis-
lative quid pro quo is constitutionally required to comport with the Fifth
Amendment. However, if a court finds such a requirement does exist,
the courts will be forced to consider whether any legal benefit provided
by the laws must apply to impacted litigants in particular or society as a
whole, and the extent the legal benefit must offer a reasonably compara-
ble substitute to harmed plaintiffs.
The Seventh Amendment jury trial issues raised by the tort reforms
are also somewhat novel. If the Court takes up this question, it will need
to consider whether the Seventh Amendment applies to federal legisla-
tion abrogating state court jury rights and the extent reforms such as
damage caps represent factual issues (traditionally considered by juries)
or legal issues (traditionally resolved by legislatures).
As for the Tenth Amendment, the third wave tort reforms described
in this article not only alter state substantive tort law, but in some cases
go on to proscribe detailed state court procedures. Although federalism-
based challenges to federal tort reforms have been unsuccessful in the
past, in recent years the Court has shown renewed interest in the Tenth
Amendment in New York v. United States490 and Printz.491 Under these
cases, the principal issue for pending tort reforms will be whether they
constitute a "commandeering" of the state legislative process, or merely
require that state courts honor federal law.
Political constraints have mandated that the third wave reforms en-
acted to date be relatively narrow and modest in their scope. It is per-
haps because of these limitations that no case has yet arisen presenting
these constitutional issues in the context of a recently enacted reform.492
However, if Congress enacts any of the broader reforms currently being
considered, the courts will likely be faced with the constitutional ques-
tions noted in this article.
489 See 512 U.S. at 418.
490 505 U.S. at 144.
491 117 S.Ct. 2365; 138 L.Ed. 2d 914; 65 U.S.L.W. 4731 (U.S. June 27, 1997) (5-4
decision).
492 For example, the dissenting views to the House Judiciary Report on the Volunteer
Protection Act noted that a Westlaw search of indicated the legislation would not have altered
the decision of any case reported over the prior seven years. H.R. Rep. No. 105-101, pt. 1, at
17 (1997).
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